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INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies have shown that discrimination litigants
1
face difficult odds. Indeed, less than 5% of all discrimination
2
plaintiffs will ever achieve any form of litigated relief. In contrast, dismissals (on motions to dismiss or at summary judgment) are extremely common in discrimination litigation, ac3
counting for a full 86% of litigated outcomes. These dismal
odds are far more extreme than those faced by any other category of federal litigant, with the sole exception of (notoriously
4
unsuccessful) prisoner plaintiffs. Moreover, they extend to vir-

1. See infra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
2. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 17 (Am. B. Found.,
Research Paper No. 08-04, 2008) [hereinafter Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093313; see
also Katharine W. Hannaford, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary U.S., RESEARCHING L., Spring
2008 at 1, 3, available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/rlspring08.pdf (summarizing findings from Uncertain Justice research project). Note that the above figures reflect only litigated (i.e., nonsettlement) outcomes. As set forth at greater length infra, those plaintiffs
whose cases are resolved through settlement outcomes also achieve very limited levels of success, with the effective recovery (after attorneys’ fees and
costs) for most plaintiffs ranging from approximately $7,000 at the EEOC level
to $15,000 for cases filed in federal court. See infra note 49 and accompanying
text.
3. See Hannaford, supra note 2 at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain
Justice, supra note 2 at 17.
4. See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 890 (2006).
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tually every conceivable procedural juncture, from motions to
5
dismiss to postverdict appeals. So what explains these results?
Surprisingly, there have been few robust attempts to answer this core question. Thus, while we have extensive data
demonstrating that discrimination litigants fare poorly in the
courts, we know very little about why. This Article—drawing on
a heretofore underexplored area of the psychological litera6
ture—attempts to begin the process of filling this gap. Specifi5. See Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; see also infra notes
44 –45 and accompanying text.
6. In contrast to the overwhelming attention that has been paid in the
legal literature to psychological findings regarding the phenomenon of implicit
bias (also referred to as subconscious or subtle bias), very few legal scholars
appear to even be aware of the psychological literature regarding attributions
to discrimination. Thus, only a few legal scholars have discussed the studies
described herein in any form, and none have fully addressed the profound implications of these studies for understanding the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face. For the most extensive exploration to date of the psychology
literature discussed herein and its potential implications for discrimination
litigation in the context of a fascinating account of majority/minority gaps in
perceptions of discrimination, see generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008). For other articles relying on
some of the studies described herein, see, for example, Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces and Legal
Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679, 698–711
(2007) (relying on several of the studies discussed herein to help explain why
people who have experienced subtle sex discrimination may not even perceive
their experience as discriminatory); Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman,
The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859,
900–05 (2008) (relying on several of the studies described herein in documenting the social costs of complaining about discrimination); Jonah Gelbach et al.,
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 797, 841–42 (2009) ( briefly summarizing certain of the studies
described herein, and noting that the available evidence suggests that the
tendency to “overlook or minimize discrimination” is more prevalent than the
tendency to over-perceive discrimination); Elizabeth Hirsh & Christopher J.
Lyons, Perceiving Discrimination on the Job: Legal Consciousness, Workplace
Context, and the Construction of Race Discrimination, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
269, 271–74 (2010) (relying in part on some of the studies described herein in
discussing the factors that influence the extent to which individuals interpret
actions as discriminatory); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A
Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination,
17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 19–24 (2011) (discussing certain portions of the literature described herein as well as related bodies of social psychological research in discussing factors that may influence decision-making in discrimination cases). Compare Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Belief in a Just World,
Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 311, 333–36
(2009) (drawing on a related literature to articulate a theory of why hate crime
statutes may be necessary in order to achieve optimal deterrence of crimes
against minorities).
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cally, this Article develops a new theoretical framework for understanding the difficulties that discrimination litigants face,
based on the extensive findings of psychology scholars regard7
ing attributions to discrimination. As set forth below, these
findings—which address in detail the circumstances in which
individuals are willing (or, critically, are not willing) to characterize a particular set of events as discrimination—have profound implications for understanding the breadth and the na8
ture of the challenges that discrimination litigants face.
So what are the fundamental findings of this understudied
area of psychological research? While the research hypotheses
have been complex and varied, the core findings of psychology
scholars have been remarkably simple: most people, in most
factual circumstances, are unwilling to make robust attribu9
tions to discrimination. Indeed, even when there is substantial
evidence of traditional invidious discriminatory intent (including so-called direct evidence) most people will decline to make
10
attributions to discrimination. This effect, moreover, is further
accentuated outside of the context of stereotypical disparate
treatment fact patterns (including, for example, circumstances
where claims are based on disparate impact and/or involve
nonstereotypical actors, such as minority-on-minority discrimi11
nation). Thus, across a wide array of factual circumstances—
ranging from traditional disparate treatment to more complex
forms of bias—psychology scholars have documented that most
people do not “see” discrimination, except where there is effec12
tively no plausible alternative.
This resistance to “seeing” discrimination appears to derive, moreover, not—as some prior scholars have theorized—
from the specifics of discrimination doctrine, but instead from

7. “Attributions to discrimination” is the term of art used by psychology
scholars to describe whether people characterize the cause of a particular negative outcome (e.g., termination, failure to hire, etc.) as being based on discrimination (or conversely, as based on some other cause). See generally Brenda Major & Pamela J. Sawyer, Attributions to Discrimination: Antecedents and
Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 89 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) ( providing an overview of the social psychological literature regarding attributions to discrimination).
8. See infra notes 9–23 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53–81 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 58–81 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 83–96 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53–96 and accompanying text.
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widely shared and deeply intractable background beliefs re13
garding discrimination and meritocracy in America. Thus,
psychology scholars have documented that most individuals
think of discrimination as a phenomenon that is explicit, restricted in its manifestations, and generally unlikely to occur in
14
America’s meritocratic society. These views, in turn, have
been shown to significantly influence (and limit) most people’s
15
willingness to make attributions to discrimination. As a result, in all but the most compelling factual circumstances, most
people believe that some measure of merit—such as effort or
ability—is a more likely explanation for why minorities fail
16
than the possibility of discrimination.
There are profound reasons to believe that these prevalent
background beliefs account, at least in part, for the dismal odds
that discrimination litigants face in litigating actual cases in
17
the courts. Indeed, the findings of psychology scholars—which
strikingly parallel numerous aspects of the outcomes faced by
discrimination litigants in the courts—are otherwise very diffi18
cult to explain. Moreover, recent experimental findings by law
and psychology scholars provide strong reasons for believing
that judges and jurors are, as a general matter, far from immune from the influence of the types of background beliefs doc19
umented by psychology scholars. Thus, while further research
is required to confirm the role of background beliefs in realworld discrimination adjudications, there are significant reasons
to—at a minimum—take seriously the work of psychology scholars in assessing contemporary recommendations for reform.
Doing so suggests a profound need to rethink existing
scholarly recommendations for remedying the limitations of anti-discrimination law. Most notably, the majority of contempo-

13. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
58–82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 153–76 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Table 1 (summarizing the overlaps between the findings of
psychology scholars and anti-discrimination case law / legal literature).
19. See infra notes 162–74 and accompanying text. Indeed, as set forth at
greater length in Part III, judges appear to be surprisingly similar to lay populations in terms of the impact of background beliefs and other psychological
factors on their decision-making approaches. See infra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
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rary scholarly proposals—most of which are focused on doctrinal reform of the anti-discrimination laws—seem likely to only
exacerbate the documented tensions between prevailing public
views and available claims, by further expanding the capa20
ciousness of contemporary discrimination doctrine. Indeed, to
the extent that broadening doctrine encourages putative victims of discrimination to bring claims that diverge even further
from common understandings of discrimination, these reform
recommendations may result in increased losses for discrimina21
tion litigants, not greater victories.
Similarly, scholarly proposals focused on internal institutional reform of private actors such as employers (an alternative that contemporary legal scholars have increasingly embraced), seem highly unlikely to result in improved outcomes
for putative victims of discrimination if one credits this psycho22
logical account. Simply put, such institutional models—which
rely on the willingness of employers and other institutional actors to “see” discrimination—have as their fundamental premise an assumption which the psychological literature tells us is
23
very likely untrue.
The findings of psychology scholars thus suggest that—to
the extent there is a desire to improve outcomes for putative
victims of discrimination—there may be a need to cast the net
more broadly, outside of the usual recommendations for reform.
In this Article, I provide an initial discussion of one such alternative: increasing the use of litigation-based approaches that
do not focus on group-based discrimination claims (i.e., approaches that do not focus on claims of discrimination based on
race, sex, age, disability, etc.). I refer to these approaches—
which may include a diverse array of litigation-based claims
ranging from “just cause” or “wrongful discharge” claims to the
Family and Medical Leave Act—as “extra-discrimination remedies” or “EDRs.” As set forth below, such EDRs, by decoupling
the inquiry from highly charged views regarding the nature
and extent of discrimination, seem uniquely poised to avoid

20. See infra notes 180–94 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of doctrinal reform approaches).
21. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 195–209 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 201 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 51–152
and accompanying text (describing the findings of psychology scholars).
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many of the obstacles that currently confront litigants in bringing discrimination claims.
This Article is organized as follows. In Part I, I provide an
overview of the empirical findings of legal scholars regarding
the low success rates of contemporary discrimination litigants,
and discuss some of the most common explanations that have
been posited for those low success rates. Part II examines the
findings of psychology scholars regarding the pervasiveness of
resistance to robust attributions to discrimination, and the
causes of that resistance. Part III discusses the reasons why it
is plausible to believe that the psychological phenomena discussed in Part II are at least partially responsible for the difficulties that discrimination litigants currently face. Finally,
Part IV discusses the implications of the foregoing for the leading reform recommendations among legal scholars of discrimination, and discusses the potential alternative of making increased use of EDRs.
A final note is in order, before proceeding to the substance
of the discussion. While the psychological literature I describe
herein provides an intuitively powerful model for understanding why discrimination claims are so hard to win, it is not
based on direct studies of judges or jurors in real-world litigation (and thus cannot directly address questions of causation in
24
case outcomes). In addition, there are no doubt other factors
that play a role in determining case outcomes (such as case
merits) which this Article does not attempt to systematically
address, except to explain the reasons why they cannot plausi24. Relatedly, the psychological research I describe herein cannot fully
answer why it is that discrimination litigants (and attorneys) continue to
bring a category of cases that are so overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Whether or
not the current success rates of discrimination litigants are caused by frivolous
lawsuits, the influence of background beliefs of the type I describe here, or,
most likely, some combination of factors, one would expect rational litigants
and attorneys to respond to such profoundly low success rates by bringing
fewer claims. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17–20 (1984) (setting out theory of litigant
behavior whereby litigated success rates should approach 50%, assuming rational actors and low litigant error rates in predicting success). A partial explanation to this question may exist insofar as there are—unlike many other
areas of the law—very few categories of discrimination cases that can safely be
assured of success. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text (discussing
the fact that many cases with significant indicia of merit are nonetheless dismissed). Thus, the only economically rational response may well be not to
bring discrimination claims at all, a response that may be morally and personally unacceptable to many discrimination litigators and plaintiffs.
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25

bly explain the full breadth of adverse outcomes that we see.
Thus, this project represents an initial attempt to provide a
theoretical framework for understanding the difficult odds
faced by discrimination litigants (and to explore the potential
implications of this framework), not an attempt to conclusively
establish the scope of the influence of the phenomena discussed
herein. Further research will be required in order to validate
the extent to which this framework in fact explains the difficult
challenges faced by contemporary discrimination litigants, as
well as to flesh out the role of other factors that are contributing to the extremely adverse outcomes that discrimination
26
litigants currently face.
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF OUTCOMES FOR
DISCRIMINATION LITIGANTS
As the work of numerous empirical scholars has demonstrated, anti-discrimination litigants have a “tough row to
27
hoe.” Indeed, of every 100 discrimination plaintiffs who liti-

25. As described in Part I, existing data strongly suggest that neither
merit—nor any of the other common explanations posited in the literature—
can provide a full explanation for the range of adverse outcomes that discrimination litigants face. See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.
26. Specific areas that could benefit from further empirical research include: (1) the role of merit in discrimination litigation outcomes (and the extent to which merit can be quantified through objective measures in the discrimination context); (2) the extent to which EDRs are in fact more likely to
succeed than discrimination causes of action (either in an experimental setting
or in real-world contexts); and (3) the tendency of judges to show results similar to those described herein in lay populations.
27. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429
(2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal
Court]. A number of scholars have made important contributions to the burgeoning empirical research regarding the success rates of discrimination litigants in the courts. See generally, e.g., Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (2005); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab,
From Bad to Worse]; Kevin M. Clermont et al., How EmploymentDiscrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556–60 (2003) [hereinafter Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs
Fare on Appeal]; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court,
supra; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 947 [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia]; Ruth
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gate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily
dismiss their claims), only 4 achieve any form (de minimis or
28
not) of relief. The other 96 of 100 see their claims rejected in
their entirety: 45 of 100 have their claims dismissed on motions
to dismiss, 41 of 100 are dismissed at summary judgment, and
29
10 of 100 lose at trial. These odds can properly be characterized as shockingly bad, and extend (with minor differences) to
every category of discrimination plaintiff, including race, sex,
30
age, and disability.

Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is
the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
111 (2009); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights
United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010) [hereinafter Nielsen et
al., Individual Justice]; Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; Wendy
Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 889 (2006); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg &
Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts
(Cornell L. Sch., Research Paper No. 08-022, 2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg &
Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1138373. Most of these studies are focused on employment discrimination
claims, by far the most common form of discrimination litigation. The few
studies that have looked at other forms of discrimination claims have shown
that those claims fare comparably to employment claims in terms of litigation
outcomes. See, e.g., Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs Fare on Appeal, supra, at
556–60, 562 (demonstrating that both jobs and non-jobs civil rights cases have
very high rates of reversals of plaintiff victories on appeal, and that both categories of cases also have among the highest disparities between reversal rates
for plaintiff and defendant victories of any doctrinal area); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra, at 954, 967 (demonstrating that jobs and “other
civil rights” cases have very similar rates of reversal of plaintiff victories on
appeal, and also both have much lower rates of reversal of Defendant victories
on appeal)); Eisenberg & Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates, supra, at 17–18
(finding that summary judgment rates for both employment discrimination
cases and other civil rights cases are consistently higher than summary judgment rates in contracts and torts cases).
28. See Hannaford, supra note 2, at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain
Justice, supra note 2, at 14, 17 (discussing results and noting that cases were
coded as “dismissals” only where involuntarily dismissed).
29. See Hannaford, supra note 2, at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain
Justice, supra note 2, at 17.
30. While scholars have shown that some classes of litigants—including
African Americans and disability litigants—fare particularly poorly at certain
junctures, including summary judgment, the overall win rates under different
statutes are in fact remarkably similar. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to
Worse, supra note 27, at 117 (Display 6). Notably, age discrimination claims—
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Figure 1
Litigated Outcomes, Federal Employment Discrimination Cases
1988–2003

Data from Hannaford, supra note 2

These abysmal results are bad not only in an absolute
sense but also in comparative perspective. Discrimination
plaintiffs fare far worse than virtually every other category of
federal litigants, including even many categories of plaintiffs
who face notoriously difficult legal standards (such as ERISA
31
plaintiffs and habeas corpus litigants). The disparity in out-

which are often thought of as the easiest type of discrimination claims to
win—are only marginally more likely to succeed than other classes of discrimination claims. Id.; see also Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at
189–92 (finding relatively little difference among success rates for different
types of discrimination claims).
31. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at
127–31 (demonstrating that employment discrimination litigants fare worse
than other federal litigants across an array of contexts); Clermont & Schwab,
How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27, at 441–42 (finding that
employment discrimination plaintiffs win less frequently than other plaintiffs); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954 –55 (showing that both employment discrimination plaintiffs and other civil rights
plaintiffs have their victories reversed considerably more often than other
classes of litigants, including habeas corpus litigants and ERISA plaintiffs).
The fact that discrimination litigants fare worse—on average—than habeas
corpus litigants is quite striking in view of the very difficult procedural and
substantive hurdles to success that habeas litigants face.
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comes between discrimination plaintiffs and other categories of
federal litigants is also remarkably consistent, extending from
32
the early stages of litigation through posttrial appeals. Thus,
the extensive adverse outcomes faced by discrimination litigants are virtually unique in the world of federal litigation, exceeding the negative outcomes faced by other litigants in both
33
scope and degree.
Figure 2
Litigation Losses, Federal Court

What explains these negative results for discrimination
plaintiffs? There have been—perhaps surprisingly—relatively
few attempts to develop a robust response to this question.
Thus, while there is a proliferation of scholarship richly addressing virtually every conceivable feature of antidiscrimination law (from the narrow and doctrinal to the broad

32. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 127–
31; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27,
at 441–42, 451; Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954 –
55; see also infra Figure 2.
33. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 127–
31; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27,
at 441–42, 451; Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954 –
55; see also infra Figure 2. As noted above, only prisoner litigants fare worse
as a class than discrimination litigants. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
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and theoretical), there are perplexingly few articles that make
serious attempts to address this core concern. Indeed, the
overwhelming majority of scholarly attempts to posit a cause
for the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face are
based on a loose, intuitive approach to understanding the phe34
nomenon, with little or no empirical foundation.
35
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of these existing explanations are a poor match for the actual experiences of discrimination litigants. For example, the explanation that has attracted
the most attention among contemporary anti-discrimination

34. For example, some of the scholars who have done very sophisticated
empirical work addressing the nature of outcomes for discrimination plaintiffs
have tended to rely on a much more speculative approach to addressing the
causation question. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra
note 27, at 112–14; Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs Fare on Appeal, supra note
27, at 563–66. But cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry
Edwards: A Case In Point!, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1275, 1281–84 (2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards] (taking a somewhat more
systematic approach); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27
(same). For some works that have taken a more systematic approach to the
question of why discrimination claims succeed or fail see, for example, Colker,
supra note 27; Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27; Nielsen et al.,
Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; Robinson, supra note 6.
35. Many, but not all. Perhaps most strikingly, many anti-discrimination
scholars have argued—albeit without systematic empirical support—that factors like the background beliefs discussed infra Part II may be partially responsible for the low success rates that discrimination plaintiffs face. See, e.g.,
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006); Judith Olans Brown et al., Some
Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A
Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487,
1489–90 (1997); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1378–81 (1988); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 789–90 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 340, 358–61 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003);
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1160–61 (1992); Charles A. Sullivan,
Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1665–66 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix From The Ash: Proving Discrimination By Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 224 –26 (2009) [hereinafter
Sullivan, The Phoenix]; Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext:
Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination
Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 37, 39
(2000). The work of psychology scholars that I describe herein can therefore be
seen as complementary, and potentially confirming of the intuitions that have
been expressed by a number of other discrimination scholars.
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scholars—that we increasingly live in a world in which forms of
bias are predominantly subtle or structural in nature—has significant limitations as a global explanation for the difficulties
36
that discrimination litigants face. For, while it is no doubt
true that claims of structural and subtle bias are challenging to
prove under contemporary anti-discrimination law, it is also
true that even traditional disparate treatment claims face sig37
nificant difficulties in the courts. Indeed, scholars have shown
by both quantitative and qualitative measures that even where
there is significant evidence of traditional discriminatory animus, discrimination litigants continue to face extremely diffi38
cult odds.
Moreover, the premise of much scholarly work in this area—that the adverse outcomes experienced by discrimination
litigants arise from the relatively recent demise of oldfashioned discriminatory animus—suffers from another significant limitation. Specifically, its assumption that the outcomes
faced by discrimination litigants are the result of recent change
is inconsistent with the long-standing nature of the difficulties
that discrimination litigants face. Indeed, discrimination litigants have encountered difficult odds since at least the late
1970s (when comprehensive data is first available), prior to the
39
theorized rise in structural and “subtle” forms of bias. Thus,

36. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 –64
(2007); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1241 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–64
(2001); see also Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 1–3 (describing the contemporary
trend); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1444 –46 (2009) (same); Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 176 (same).
37. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 540–41, 546 (2001); Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 192; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 737–53 (2007); Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof
of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
37, 39 (2000); see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at
106; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that
despite the common perception that discrimination cases have been subject to
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while the challenges of proving structural and subtle discrimination no doubt play a role in the adverse outcomes faced by
discrimination litigants, they provide a fundamentally incomplete explanation for the globally negative results that have
been documented by empirical scholars.
Another common explanation—based principally on theoretical work from the law and economics wing of the legal academy—has been to theorize that the overwhelmingly negative
outcomes that discrimination litigants face must arise from a
40
concomitant lack of merit in discrimination claims. But, this
explanation too is a poor “fit” for the actual results that we see
in the courts. For example:
 Empirical scholars have shown that objective measures
of case merit (including for example, whether or not the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
made a “cause” finding, and the EEOC’s initial assessment of the case’s merits) are not correlated to case outcomes (including, for example, the likelihood of dismissal
on motions to dismiss or summary judgment). Thus, even
those cases that meet objective indicia of merit are sub41
jected to dismissal at very high rates.
 Qualitative research addressing the nature of the cases
that are dismissed at summary judgment and on judg-

increasing dismissals in recent years as a result of changes in the political
tenor of the judiciary, the data do not support the existence of such a trend).
40. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction
Costs, and Mediation: Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation Program, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 41 n.146 (2008); cf. Selmi, supra note 27, at 569–71
(considering, and ultimately rejecting, the possibility that the difficulties that
discrimination litigants face may arise primarily from a surfeit of frivolous
claims, but also noting that “it does seem, for whatever reason, that there are
a fair number . . . of . . . discrimination cases that should never have been
filed”). See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4 –5 (initial articulation
of model often relied on by contemporary scholars in arguing that discrimination litigants must fare worse because of lack of merit). In addition to the literature cited herein, this assumption—that discrimination claims must be
predominantly non-meritorious—is by far the most common response that I
have informally received while discussing the profoundly low success rates of
discrimination plaintiffs with other academics.
41. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 191, 193; see also
Clermont & Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards, supra note 34, at 1282–83 (responding to Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (And Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002)) (conducting
an initial assessment of one measure of merit on appeal and finding that it did
not explain case outcomes).
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ment as a matter of law has shown that many such cases
are far from frivolous. Indeed, even those cases that have
so-called direct evidence of discriminatory animus (for
example explicit use of racial or gender-based epithets)
are quite routinely dismissed at summary judgment and
42
on judgment as a matter of law.
 Discrimination plaintiffs have far fewer trial victories
(28%) than other categories of federal plaintiffs (45%),
despite the fact that judges regularly grant motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment in discrimination cases, thus presumably leaving only the strongest
43
cases for trial.
 Even those few discrimination plaintiffs who win trial
victories face a startlingly high rate of reversals during
44
posttrial appeals (41%). This rate far exceeds the com-

42. See, e.g., Kelly v. Moser, Patterson & Sheridan, LLP, 348 F. App’x 746,
751 (3d Cir. 2009); Fitzgerald v. Action, Inc., 521 F.3d 867, 877 (8th Cir. 2008);
Ramlet v. E.F. Johnson Co., 507 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (8th Cir. 2007); Twymon
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2006); Arraleh v. County
of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976–78 (8th Cir. 2006); Mateu-Anderegg v. School
Dist., 304 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2002); Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271
F.3d 212, 224 (5th Cir. 2001); Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204,
1210 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546–47 (10th
Cir. 1993). Most of the cases cited herein were located through a quick search
for “stray remarks” since this is often the rubric under which courts reject explicit evidence of discriminatory intent at summary judgment. While it is clear
that summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law are not infrequently
granted even in the presence of comments indicative of traditional invidious
discriminatory intent, further research is required in order to systematically
assess the extent to which this is true. For existing studies examining the circumstances under which summary judgment is granted in discrimination litigation, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Letter from Stephen
B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Admin. of Justice, Univ. of Pa., to
Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts 10–12 (Jan. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Burbank Letter]
(on file with the author) (discussing concerns regarding the possibility that
judges in employment discrimination cases are engaging in a form of “cognitive illiberalism” in adjudicating cases at summary judgment).
43. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 129;
see also Parker, supra note 27, at 894, 921–24.
44. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 109;
see also Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note
27, at 450 (finding slightly different, but comparable numbers); Clermont &
Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954 –55 (same); Colker, supra note
27, at 259–61, 271 (finding even worse post-trial odds for ADA plaintiffs, but
based on a more limited sample).
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parable reversal rate for discrimination defendants who
have prevailed at trial (9%) and also very significantly
exceeds the reversal rate for other classes of successful
45
federal plaintiffs (28%).
Thus, while merit undoubtedly does play some role in the
46
adverse outcomes that discrimination litigants face, it cannot
provide a plausible explanation for the full range of adverse
outcomes that discrimination litigants face. The adverse outcomes are simply too broad—in both scope and depth—to be
wholly attributed to a surfeit of frivolous claims.
Finally, related to the “merit” hypothesis, it has sometimes
been posited that the adverse litigation outcomes faced by discrimination litigants must be the result of the settlement of
47
meritorious claims, leaving only the worst cases for litigation.
But, in addition to the data discussed above (which show that it
is not only nonmeritorious cases that face adverse outcomes),
direct studies of discrimination settlements are fundamentally
inconsistent with the premise that settlements represent the
strongest subset of discrimination claims. Indeed, the only article to have addressed this issue from an empirical (as opposed
to theoretical) perspective found no consistent relationship be48
tween case merits and settlement.
Moreover, data regarding the average size of discrimination settlements reflects an average settlement recovery of only

45. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 109 (reversal rate for discrimination defendants who prevailed at trial); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 948 (reversal rate for federal plaintiffs in all cases); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27,
at 954 –55 (showing that employment discrimination and other civil rights
cases have the highest reversal rates of plaintiff victories of any category of
federal cases).
46. There are two areas, in particular, where it seems likely that nonmeritorious cases play a significant role in the adverse outcomes that discrimination litigants face: (1) early stage dismissals and (2) pro se claims. See, e.g.,
Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 188–89. As noted previously, the role of merits in discrimination outcomes—and the extent to which
merits can be objectively quantified in discrimination litigation—are both areas that are ripe for further scholarly inquiry. See supra note 26.
47. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 569; see also Harris, supra note 40, at 41
n.146 (hypothesizing that discrimination plaintiffs may be systematically
worse than discrimination Defendants at predicting litigation success and that
this may lead to non-meritorious cases failing to settle). This is an explanation
which has, again, been raised very frequently in my informal discussions with
other legal scholars of the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face.
48. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 191.
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$14,000 at the EEOC level and $30,000 in litigation—hardly
what one would expect if settlements were among the most
49
meritorious claims. In contrast, tried cases—while they also
tend to result in relatively modest awards—have, on average,
individual awards that are at least three to five times the size
of the average settlement (and that are exclusive of attorneys’
50
fees and costs). Thus, the hypothesis of settlement drain of
meritorious cases—while again perhaps a partial explanation—
is largely inconsistent with existing data regarding the nature
of discrimination settlements.
So if none of the foregoing explanations fit the data, what
does explain the pervasiveness of unfavorable results for discrimination plaintiffs? In the following two Parts, I explore at
length another possible explanation: that the difficulties that
discrimination litigants face arise—at least in part—from a
much broader and deeper resistance among the American public to making attributions to discrimination. As set forth in Part
II, the findings of psychology scholars strongly support this explanation, with experimental results showing again and again
that most people are reluctant to make attributions to discrimination, even where they are presented with quite explicit or
objective evidence. In Part II, I detail the work of psychology
scholars, followed by a discussion in Part III of the reasons why
that work provides a compelling explanation for the very difficult odds that discrimination litigants face.

49. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of
Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
111, 144 (2007); Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 187; Laura
Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 3, 22–23 (Laura Beth Nielsen
& Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005); Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2,
at 17. These figures probably reflect an actual recovery for discrimination litigants of roughly $7000 (at the EEOC) to $15,000 (in litigation), given that
they are inclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs. Interestingly, Professor Kotkin
characterizes these results as showing a relatively high level of success for
employment discrimination litigants, see Kotkin, supra, at 117, whereas Professor Nielsen does not, see Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at
17, 32–33.
50. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 188; Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 49, at 28. This figure may significantly understate the disparity between awards at settlement and at trial, as trial victors are also entitled to a separate award of attorneys’ fees and costs, an award that can often
significantly exceed the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff.
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II. FINDINGS OF PSYCHOLOGY SCHOLARS REGARDING
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION
Psychologists entered the research field of attributions to
discrimination concerned primarily with the views of minority
51
group members. Under what circumstances do minority group
members attribute a particular set of events to discrimination?
Based on the presumed psychological benefits of attributing
negative outcomes to discrimination (as opposed, for example,
to attributing a negative outcome to one’s own skill) and minority group members’ presumed repeated experience with discrimination (leading to a heightened sensitivity to cues of discrimination), scholars hypothesized a “hypervigilance” vis-à-vis
discrimination, i.e., a tendency to make attributions to discrim52
ination where there is any plausible basis for doing so.
Ironically, the field of research that started out with a hypothesis of hypervigilance has led to a vast array of findings of
53
precisely the opposite phenomenon. While scholars have found
support for the notion that members of minority groups are
sometimes willing to make attributions to discrimination in
situations of ambiguity, they have also found that they are
even more likely to downplay and underestimate the likelihood
54
that discrimination has occurred. These tendencies are, moreover, even more pronounced among nonminority observers of
discrimination (e.g., white male bystanders or jurors), who
show an even lesser willingness to make attributions to discrimination when they are asked to assess whether discrimina55
tion has occurred. Across all groups, the likelihood of making
51. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Attributions to Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances, 34 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 251, 258 (2002).
52. See, e.g., id. at 253–61, 266–68; see also GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 144 –45 (1979); Jennifer Crocker & Brenda Major, Social
Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma, 96 PSYCHOL.
REV. 608, 612–13 (1989).
53. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 91 (noting that the tendency to minimize discrimination is by now the “prevailing view among scholars”).
See generally infra notes 59–96 and accompanying text for the specific findings of scholars in this regard.
54. See infra notes 59–96 and accompanying text.
55. See e.g., Mary L. Inman, Do You See What I See?: Similarities and Differences in Victims’ and Observers’ Perceptions of Discrimination, 19 SOC.
COGNITION 521, 543 (2001); Mary L. Inman & Robert S. Baron, Influence of
Prototypes on Perceptions of Prejudice, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
727, 728, 732, 736 (1996). See generally Robinson, supra note 6 ( providing a
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attributions to discrimination decreases even further under factual circumstances that do not closely resemble the stereotypical disparate treatment paradigm (e.g., no clear evidence of in56
tent, minority on minority discrimination).
What accounts for these counterintuitive findings? Psychologists have hypothesized a number of possibilities, but
leading among them are two basic theories: (1) that there is a
tension between making attributions to discrimination and
widely held American value systems, such as the belief that
hard work gets you ahead in life; and (2) that due to cognitive
factors, people’s preexisting prototypes of discrimination (typically narrow disparate treatment) and their beliefs about the
commonality of discrimination (typically rare) have a significant effect on the extent to which they make attributions to
57
discrimination. Both of these theories have accumulated considerable experimental support, and appear to be at least partially responsible for the widespread reluctance to make attributions to discrimination that scholars have observed. Below,
the basic “minimization” phenomenon is described, followed by
a discussion of the principal causal factors for which there is
substantial support in the literature.
A. THE BASIC PHENOMENON: RESISTANCE TO ROBUST
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION
Across a wide variety of contexts, psychology scholars have
found a pronounced unwillingness to make attributions to discrimination, even in the presence of quite compelling facts.
Consider, for example, the following experiment conducted by
law and psychology scholars Tess Wilkenson-Ryan and Catherine Struve. Study participants were given a description of the
facts underlying a hypothetical lawsuit alleging discriminatory
failure to promote, and were asked to assess whether or not
they would find discrimination. Inter alia study participants
58
were told that :

fascinating account of majority/minority gaps in perceptions of discrimination).
56. See infra notes 82–96 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 97–153 and accompanying text.
58. All facts and results are drawn from Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Catherine Struve, Abstract and Study Format (on file with author). The results discussed here are based on a preliminary analysis by the study authors, and are
subject to further revision/analysis.
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 The Plaintiff (Anita) was explicitly told by her boss prior
to the contested promotion decision that he wanted to
replace the women in the workplace with men.
 The Plaintiff was also told by her boss that “women
should only be in subservient positions.”
 The Plaintiff’s boss told a co-worker directly that he
would never promote Anita to the contested position.
 A man who did not meet the posted qualifications for the
job received the position, despite the fact that Anita (who
did not receive the position) was qualified.
Despite these overwhelming facts, when given a standard
59
disparate treatment instruction, only roughly half (i.e., 51.4%)
of mock jurors found in Anita’s favor. That is, close to 50% of all
mock jurors did not consider this evidence to warrant a finding
60
of liability.
Other experiments have found similar results. Thus, for
61
example in a 1999 study, Teri Elkins and her colleague James
Phillips found that—on average—study participants were not
persuaded to make affirmative findings of discrimination, even
in the presence of evidence demonstrating inter alia that:
 The unsuccessful female promotion candidate was asked
blatantly discriminatory questions during the job interview such as “How do you intend to balance family obli-

59. The full instruction given was as follows:
To win on her claim of sex discrimination, Pace must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her sex was a determinative factor in
PennDOT ’s decision not to promote her to Contract Compliance Investigator. ‘Determinative factor’ means that if not for Pace’s sex, she
would have been promoted. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
means proof that shows that something is more likely true than not
true.
Id.
60. Id. The results set out in the text above are for the study condition in
which study participants were given this instruction after the presentation of
evidence (as opposed to both prior to and following the presentation of evidence).
61. Teri J. Elkins & James S. Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination
Claims: The Mediating Role of Attributions, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 186, 194 –
97 (1999) [hereinafter Elkins & Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination
Claims] (explaining and reporting results from the second of two studies); see
also Teri J. Elkins & James S. Phillips, Global Air Corporation: Promotion
Scenario #12 [hereinafter Elkins & Phillips, Study Promotion Scenario, Moderate Evidence Condition] (unpublished promotion scenario providing a moderate strength-of-evidence condition, used for Study 2 in Elkins & Phillips,
Evaluating Sex Discrimination Claims, supra, at 194 –97) (on file with author).
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gations with the demands of the Chief Pilot position” and
“Why would an attractive woman like you want to be a
62
Chief Pilot anyway?”
 The HR manager who made the final decision to promote
a man over the Plaintiff had previously made remarks to
the effect that he preferred the “good old days when the
men flew the planes and women smiled at the customers
63
and served them lunch.”
 The HR manager who made the final decision to promote
a man over the Plaintiff rejected the ranking of the jobsearch committee (which had voted 2-1 in favor of the
female candidate) after having a private meeting with
the only member of the committee who had voted in fa64
vor of the successful male candidate.
 The only other time the HR manager had ever overruled
the search committee’s recommendation in the past also
resulted in a less highly ranked man being promoted to
65
the position, in place of a woman.
Despite these compelling facts, study participants did not
perceive discrimination as a particularly likely explanation for
the non-selection of the female candidate. Indeed, the mean responses to the study questions assessing judgments of discrimination were at exactly the scale mid-point used by the authors,
indicating that—on average—study participants did not per66
ceive the conduct as affirmatively discriminatory.
In another study, Elkins and Phillips evaluated the willingness of study participants to make attributions to discrimination under circumstances designed to more closely track the
type of evidence typically available to the average discrimina67
tion claimant. Thus, they presented the Plaintiff as having

62. Elkins & Phillips, Study Promotion Scenario, Moderate Evidence
Condition, supra note 61, at 10.
63. Id. at 8–9.
64. Id. at 5–6.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.; Elkins & Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination Claims, supra
note 61, at 195 tbl.4.
67. Teri J. Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases in Evaluations of Sex Discrimination Allegations: Is Perceived Threat the Key?, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
280, 283 (2002) [hereinafter Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases] (explaining
and reporting results from the first of three studies); see also Teri J. Elkins et
al., Dorothy Patterson (Plaintiff ) v. Global Airlines (Defendant): Promotion
Scenario #12 [hereinafter Elkins et al., Study Promotion Scenario, Female Pi-
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made out a prima facie case (as part of which, the Plaintiff presented some evidence of more favorable treatment of nonminorities), and also as having presented moderately strong evidence that the reason given for the adverse employment deci68
sion was pretextual. This evidence is technically sufficient to
make out a discrimination case under the McDonnell Doug69
70
las /Burdine framework, and given the legal incentives not to
make blatantly biased statements, may be the only evidence
71
that is available to a victim of discrimination. Nevertheless, it
is apparently unpersuasive to many observers—Elkins and
Phillips found that the mean study participant assessed discrimination at only a 3.10 on a 7-point scale (reflecting a judg72
ment that discrimination had not occurred).
A number of other scholars, instead of asking study participants to evaluate whether they would find discrimination in a
hypothetical scenario, have experimentally manipulated participants’ environments to include information that might cause a
reasonable observer to conclude that there was discrimination.
Although these experiments have taken a variety of forms, the

lot Condition] (unpublished study promotion scenario wherein a female candidate for chief pilot is passed over for promotion, used in Study 1 in Elkins et
al., Gender-Related Biases, supra, at 283) (on file with author).
68. Elkins et al., Study Promotion Scenario, Female Pilot Condition, supra note 67, at 1–5.
69. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
70. Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
71. Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a jury can find
discrimination, although they need not do so, where a plaintiff has come forward with a prima facie case, coupled with evidence of pretext (i.e., evidence
showing that the employer’s stated reason is false). See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000). While the elements of an
employment discrimination prima facie case differ depending on the context of
the case, they commonly center on a showing that one or more nonminorities
were treated more favorably (either because they got the contested position,
or, in the case of a termination or demotion, because they were not terminated
or demoted in similar circumstances). Evidence of pretext can also vary widely, but often focuses on inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation or a
showing that the reason put forward is factually false.
72. Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases, supra note 67, at 283. The results
of this study highlight the extent of the mismatch between how the public perceives discrimination and what is legally sufficient to make out a case of discrimination based on the Supreme Court’s precedents. It may be that this
mismatch is part of what is driving high rates of summary judgment grants in
circumstances where it seems unwarranted given existing law. Cf. Krieger,
supra note 35, at 341 (making a similar argument in relation to the judicial
backlash against the ADA).
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most common design involves a variation on the following set of
facts (hereinafter “biased testing” design):
Experiment participants are asked to take a test with the possibility
of subjective scoring (often a creativity test). They are told that the
test is a predictor of future success and that the person who scores
best on the test will receive some benefit (typically an opportunity to
win a sum of money). After the tests have been submitted for grading,
a confederate (who appears to the other participants to be just another participant) makes a statement to the effect that she knows the
person who will be grading the exams to be biased against a particular group (typically women or African Americans), and that she
doesn’t believe he’ll say a (woman/minority) got the best score. The
(female/minority) participants then receive negative feedback on their
exams, and a (man/white student) is audibly told that he or she re73
ceived the highest score and hence the prize.

These scenarios, like the studies described supra, contain
significantly more explicit evidence of discrimination than exists in many real-life contexts. Nevertheless, most scholars
have found that many “observers” and “victims” are unwilling
to make attributions to discrimination on this basic set of facts,
and instead attribute the failure of the women and minority
participants primarily to factors internal to the victims (such as
74
ability, effort, etc.).
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence that scholars have
found of a “minimization” effect has come from experiments
giving subjects an objective measure of the likelihood that they

73. The following articles, among others, rely on some version of this experimental scenario: Wayne H. Bylsma et al., The Influence of Legitimacy Appraisals on the Determinants of Entitlement Beliefs, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 223, 228–29 (1995); Brenda Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination and Self-Esteem: Impact of Group Identification and Situational Ambiguity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 220, 224 (2003); Robin E. Roy et al., If
She’s a Feminist It Must Not Be Discrimination: The Power of the Feminist
Label on Observers’ Attributions About a Sexist Event, 60 SEX ROLES 422,
424 –25 (2009); Anna Berlin, The Effects of Differential Discrimination Cues
on Attributions for Failure: Implications for Subsequent Performance 35–39
(Aug. 2006) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Ohio University), available at http://etd
.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Berlin%20Anna.pdf?ohiou1156451468.
74. See, e.g., Bylsma et al., supra note 73, at 229–30 (finding that the average participant attributed to discrimination at less than the scale midpoint,
indicating belief that discrimination had not occurred); Roy et al., supra note
73, at 429 (discussing low levels of attributions to discrimination across study
conditions); Berlin, supra note 73, at 40 tbl.1 (reporting that study participants attributed a larger proportion of outcome to effort and ability than to
discrimination in most experimental conditions, and that across all conditions,
subjects reported on average that they disagreed that discrimination had occurred).
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75

have been subjected to discrimination. Following a similar
procedure to the “biased testing” design, study participants
(women or racial minorities) take an exam or write an essay
with the potential for subjective grading, that they believe to be
76
predictive of ability. They are then told by a confederate (who
they believe to be the experimenter’s assistant) that all of the
judges are majority group members (men or whites, depending
on the study design) and that either all, none, or some proportion of them (depending on the study, 25%, 50% or 75%) dis77
criminate against minorities. The minority participants then
78
are given their test with a failing grade marked on it.
Despite the seeming objectivity of the information that
subjects receive regarding the likelihood of discrimination,
scholars have consistently found that subjects attribute their
failure significantly less to discrimination than would be expected based on the data that they have been given. For example, Karen Ruggiero and Donald Taylor found that subjects
made attributions to discrimination at very low levels (roughly
averaging a three on a ten-point scale), in any context where
the certainty of discrimination was less than 100% (but greater

75. Much of the pertinent research relating to objective measures of the
probability of discrimination was conducted by Karen Ruggiero, then a leading
scholar in the field of perception of discrimination. Karen Ruggiero was subsequently forced to resign from her position as a professor at University of Texas
at Austin, as a result of the falsification of data in certain studies that she
conducted, which led to the retraction of a number of her publications. The two
pieces that are relied on herein were not retracted and continue to be regularly relied on in the social psychology literature. In addition, Ruggiero’s coauthor (Donald Taylor), who has never been the subject of any accusations of
misconduct, has verified the genuineness of the data that was relied on in the
analyses discussed herein. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 1142 n.227.
76. Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Coping With Discrimination:
How Disadvantaged Group Members Perceive the Discrimination That Confronts Them, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 826, 828, 832–833 (1995)
[hereinafter Ruggiero & Taylor, Coping With Discrimination] ( leading article
to employ this methodology); see also Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor,
Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination
That Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived Control, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 377, 381 (1997) [hereinafter Ruggiero &
Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive Discrimination] (employing a
similar study design).
77. See Ruggiero & Taylor, Coping With Discrimination, supra note 76, at
828–29, 832–34; Ruggiero & Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive
Discrimination, supra note 76, at 377–78, 381–82.
78. See sources cited supra note 77.
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79

than 0%). Moreover, most subjects significantly attributed
their failure to the quality of their answers (roughly a seven on
a ten-point scale), even in circumstances where they were told
it was highly likely that they had been subjected to discrimina80
tion. Indeed, even in the circumstance where participants
were told it was a certainty (100%) that their test was graded
by a person who discriminates, they continued to significantly
attribute their grade to the quality of their answers, and rated
the likelihood of discrimination only slightly to somewhat above
81
the scale midpoint.
Collectively, then, psychology scholars have found extensive support for the conclusion that people are reluctant to
make attributions to discrimination, even in the presence of
compelling “direct” evidence, and even when given objective
82
measures of the likelihood that discrimination has occurred.

79. See sources cited supra note 77.
80. See sources cited supra note 77.
81. See sources cited supra note 77; accord Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T.
Miller, Reacting to Impending Discrimination: Compensation for Prejudice &
Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1357,
1364 (2001). Although Kaiser and Miller’s data showed a substantial minimization effect for the 100% condition, they did not show a substantial minimization effect for the 50% condition. Id.
82. In addition to the literature specifically discussed above, a significant
number of other studies have found substantial tendencies to discount or
downplay the likelihood of discrimination, even where there are significant
objective indicators that discrimination has occurred. See Christia Spears
Brown & Rebecca S. Bigler, Children’s Perceptions of Gender Discrimination,
40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 714, 722 (2004); Don Operario & Susan T.
Fiske, Ethnic Identity Moderates Perceptions of Prejudice: Judgments of Personal Versus Group Discrimination and Subtle Versus Blatant Bias, 27 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 550, 557 (2001); Gretchen Sechrist et al.,
When Do the Stigmatized Make Attributions to Discrimination Occurring to the
Self and Others? The Roles of Self-Presentation and the Need for Control, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 117 (2004); Janet K. Swim et al., The Role
of Intent and Harm in Judgments of Prejudice and Discrimination, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 944, 954 (2003) [hereinafter Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice]; see also Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 371, 376 (1984) (noting that although working
women are likely to be victims of discrimination “they showed few signs of
feeling personally discriminated against”); Yumiko Nishimuta, The Interpretation of Racial Encounters: Japanese Students in Britain, 34 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 133, 143–47 (2008) (analyzing the responses of study participants who reported experiencing discrimination, but failed to characterize the
experience as such); Jacquie D. Vorauer & Sandra M. Kumhyr, Is This About
You or Me? Self- Versus Other-Directed Judgments and Feelings in Response to
Intergroup Interaction, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 706, 713
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This general tendency to discount the possibility of discrimination becomes even more pronounced outside of the stereotypical
83
disparate treatment context. Indeed, it appears that a variety
of contextual factors, including the perceived intent of the actor, the good faith nature of stereotype-driven behavior, and the
identity of the actors play a critical role in moderating attribu84
tions to discrimination.
Perhaps the most striking finding of psychology scholars in
this regard is that the intent of the perpetrator is a critical determinant of observers’ willingness to make attributions to discrimination. For example, a 2003 study by Janet K. Swim and
colleagues presented participants with a series of vignettes in
which both the intent of the actor and the harm to the victim
85
were varied across conditions. They found that people were
consistently more reluctant to label as discrimination scenarios
in which the actor was portrayed as lacking intent to harm minority group members, or having acted in a thoughtless or ste86
reotyped (but not deliberately malicious) way. This effect,
moreover, extended to those circumstances where minority
group members were significantly harmed as a result of the ac87
tor’s treatment.
Other scholars have found similar results, showing that
people are extremely reluctant to make findings of discrimination in what might be thought of as classic “disparate impact”
contexts. Thus, for example, Foster and Dion found that people
were very reluctant to make attributions to discrimination in a
context where they were told that women fared worse than men
88
on a particular test, but there was no clear evidence of intent.
Similarly, Kappen and Branscombe found that exclusion based
on inadequate height and weight—factors that the Supreme

(2001) (experimentally finding that members of minority groups did not assess
high prejudice and low prejudice conversation partners differently, despite the
fact that those exposed to high prejudice partners experienced significantly
greater discomfort and self-directed negativity).
83. See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text.
85. See Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 958–59
(appendix containing the study vignettes used).
86. Id. at 951–52.
87. Id.
88. See Mindi D. Foster & Kenneth L. Dion, The Role of Hardiness in
Moderating the Relationship Between Global/Specific Attributions and Actions
Against Discrimination, 51 SEX ROLES 161, 164 –66 (2004).
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Court has acknowledged have a disparate impact against wom89
en—are generally not perceived by subjects as discriminatory.
Thus, it appears that most subjects simply do not perceive nonintended acts as discriminatory, even where they adversely im90
pact minority groups.
The extent of harm to the victim has also been found to
have a significant impact on willingness to make judgments of
discrimination, particularly under circumstances of ambiguous
intent. Thus, where subjects are told that a particular incident
resulted in no concrete harm to the victim—and are given no
information about intent—they are much less likely to make
91
attributions to discrimination. Similarly, subjects much more
rarely characterize forms of disparate treatment with mixed
harm implications for victims—such as “benevolent” sexism or
92
paternalism—as discrimination.
The identities of the actor and the victim have also been
found to have substantial effects on the frequency with which
people make attributions to discrimination. Thus, people are
significantly more likely to make attributions to discrimination
where the scenario described involves a “classic” disparate
treatment dyad (e.g., a man discriminating against a woman or

89. See Diane M. Kappen & Nyla R. Branscombe, The Effects of Reasons
Given for Ineligibility on Perceived Gender Discrimination and Feelings of Injustice, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 300, 302 (2001); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328–31 (1977) (recognizing that height and weight
qualifications can have a disparate impact on women).
90. Indeed, one scholar found that subjects expressed confusion and difficulty in following instructions when they were instructed to make attributions
to discrimination based on a disparate impact paradigm. See E-mail from Laurie T. O’Brien, Assistant Professor, Tulane Univ. to Katie R. Eyer, Research
Scholar, Univ. of Pa. (Sept. 11, 2009, 15:04:21 EST ) (on file with author).
91. E.g., Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951 fig.2
(finding study subjects rated the attribution to discrimination at only 2.08 on a
seven-point scale in no-harm condition, whereas the mean attribution for highharm condition was 3.92).
92. E.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett & Janet K. Swim, Appraisals of Prejudice
and Discrimination, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 11, 22 (1998)
(“[T]he positive aspects of benevolent forms of discrimination such as paternalism may make it difficult for people to recognize this . . . as indicative of prejudice.” (citations omitted)); Janet K. Swim et al., Judgments of Sexism: A Comparison of the Subtlety of Sexism Measures and Sources of Variability in
Judgments of Sexism, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406, 409 (2005) [hereinafter
Swim et al., Judgments of Sexism] (reporting that respondents were unlikely
to perceive benevolent sexist attitudes as sexist).

1302

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1275
93

a white person discriminating against a racial minority). Outside of these “classic” discrimination scenarios (for example in
the minority on minority discrimination context), observers are
94
far less likely to make attributions to discrimination.
Finally, the perceived controllability of the victim’s stigmatized status appears to have a significant effect on people’s willingness to make attributions to discrimination, and the extent
to which differential treatment is perceived as legitimate. Thus,
people make fewer attributions to discrimination (and are more
likely to characterize differential treatment as legitimate)
where the basis for stigmatization is perceived to be within the
95
victim’s control. As a result, differential treatment of certain
groups (such as the overweight, those with certain mental and
physical disabilities, and gays and lesbians) is less likely to be
interpreted as discriminatory, and more likely to be viewed as
justified, than discrimination against groups whose statuses
96
are perceived as immutable (e.g., women, African Americans).

93. E.g., Derek R. Avery et al., What Are the Odds? How Demographic
Similarity Affects the Prevalence of Perceived Employment Discrimination, 93
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 235, 236 (2008); Inman & Baron, supra note 55, at 732;
Angela J. Krumm & Alexandra F. Corning, Perceived Control as a Moderator
of the Prototype Effect in the Perception of Discrimination, 38 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1109, 1110–12 (2008); Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94 –95.
94. E.g., Inman & Baron, supra note 55, at 732.
95. E.g., Major et al., supra note 51, at 288–89; Major & Sawyer, supra
note 7, at 98; see also Bruce Blaine & Zoe Williams, Belief in the Controllability of Weight and Attributions to Prejudice Among Heavyweight Women, 51
SEX ROLES 79, 83 (2004) (finding that priming participants with materials
emphasizing the controllability of weight decreased overweight individuals’
tendency to characterize their rejection as based on prejudice); Jennifer
Crocker et al., The Stigma of Overweight: Affective Consequences of
Attributional Ambiguity, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 60, 66 (1993)
(finding overweight women–while attributing their rejection to their weight–
did not characterize this rejection as discriminatory).
96. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 95, at 66; Major et al., supra note
51, at 288–89; Bernard Weiner et al., An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to
Stigmas, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 738, 740–41, 745–46 (1988) (reporting that study participants had more positive reactions to individuals with
disabilities that were perceived as being outside of the individual’s control); see
also Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Attributions and the Regulation of Marriage: Considering the Parallels Between Race and Homosexuality,
38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 233, 236 (2005) (finding that opposition to a ban on
gay marriage correlates with the belief that sexual orientation is attributable
to biological origins); Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Beliefs
About the Origins of Homosexuality and Support for Gay Rights, 72 PUB.
OPINION Q. 291, 300 tbl.2 (2008) (same); Ryan M. Quist & Douglas M.
Wiegand, Attributions of Hate: The Media’s Causal Attributions of a Homo-
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B. REASONS FOR THE BASIC PHENOMENON
Why do people resist making attributions to discrimination, particularly outside of the classic disparate treatment context? Research by psychology scholars suggests a major role for
two key psychological factors: (1) the tension between widespread American belief systems regarding meritocracy and
making attributions to discrimination; and (2) the influence of
widespread views regarding the nature and commonality of
discrimination on how potentially discriminatory events are
perceived. As detailed below, psychologists have found considerable support for the conclusion that each of these factors
plays a substantial role in influencing (and minimizing) the extent to which individual observers make attributions to
97
discrimination.
phobic Murder, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 93, 103–04 (2002) (in survey of articles discussing the Matthew Shepard murder finding that “[a]rticles that were
more likely to attribute homosexuality to controllable causes also were coded
as less likely to have favorable attitudes towards homosexuals or antigay hate
crime legislation”).
97. Victims of discrimination, while subject to some extent to the same
psychological constraints described herein, are also subject to a much more
complicated array of motivational and cognitive influences on their willingness
to make attributions to discrimination. See, e.g., Major et al., supra note 51, at
270–72, 279–86 (summarizing research regarding perceptions and reporting of
discrimination by victims); Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and
Claiming Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES, supra note 49, at 285, 286–89, 291–92
(same); J. Nicole Shelton & Rebecca E. Stewart, Confronting Perpetrators of
Prejudice: The Inhibitory Effects of Social Costs, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 215,
220–21 (2004) (describing how perceived personal costs can influence the likelihood of confronting discrimination); see also Cheryl R. Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat & the Interpersonal Consequences of Attributions to Discrimination, in STIGMA & GROUP INEQUALITY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
45, 47–50 (Shana Levin & Colette van Laar, eds. 2006) [hereinafter Kaiser,
Dominant Ideology Threat] (describing research showing that complaining of
discrimination leads to increased derogation of victims of discrimination, even
where there is strong corroborative evidence of discrimination). Because the
factors affecting victims’ attributions (insofar as those factors are unique to
victims) are not relevant to the central issue here (when judges and jurors are
willing to make attributions to discrimination), they are not discussed in this
Article. In addition, I have omitted a discussion of a few factors that have been
shown to influence perceptions of discrimination, but which are impossible to
interpret in terms of their practical significance for judge and juror decisionmaking. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Sechrist et al., Mood as Information in Making
Attributions to Discrimination, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 524,
528–29 (2003) (finding mood appears to moderate both observers’ and victims’
tendency to make attributions to discrimination, with attributions to discrimination being less likely when mood is elevated than when it is depressed).
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1. Meritocracy Beliefs and Attributions to Discrimination
It is well-established that the overwhelming majority of
Americans—of all groups and races—subscribe to some extent
98
to meritocracy beliefs. Indeed, meritocracy beliefs are so widespread in the United States that they are frequently referred to
99
as the dominant or national American ideology. Meritocracy
beliefs can take a variety of forms, but typically center around
a cluster of related beliefs that: (1) hard work gets you ahead in
life; (2) advancement is possible for all individuals in American
society; and (3) people usually get what they deserve based on
100
their effort and skill.

98. See, e.g., JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE 44, 49, 287–
89 (1986) (documenting American meritocracy beliefs and referring to such beliefs as the “dominant ideology” in America); John T. Jost et al., Social Inequality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System:
Evidence of Enhanced System Justification Among the Disadvantaged, 33
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 26 (2003) (finding that all groups surveyed, including minority groups, “endorsed meritocratic ideology to a relatively strong extent” and describing survey results); Sheri R. Levy et al., Hurricane Katrina’s
Impact on African Americans’ and European Americans Endorsement of the
Protestant Work Ethic, 6 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 75, 75–76 (2006)
(noting that the Protestant Work Ethic—a type of meritocracy belief—“is widely endorsed by Americans of all ages and backgrounds, and thought to be a
stable, deeply ingrained cultural belief ”); Brenda Major & Toni Schmader, Legitimacy and the Construal of Social Disadvantage, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 176, 182 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001) (describing meritocracy beliefs as the “dominant ideology” in the United States and
noting that such beliefs are widely ascribed to even by those who are disadvantaged in society). The literature in this area has used a variety of terms
and constructs to address this issue, including “Belief in a Just World” (BJW)
and “Protestant Work Ethic” (PWE). For linguistic and analytical ease, I use
here the single term “meritocracy beliefs” to describe these various constructs,
with the caveat that using that single term somewhat simplifies the experimental picture.
99. See e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 23, 287–89; see also Major & Schmader, supra note 98, at 182; cf. Lindsay E. Rankin et al., System
Justification and the Meaning of Life: Are the Existential Benefits of Ideology
Distributed Unequally Across Racial Groups?, 22 SOC. JUST. RES. 312, 324 –26
(2009) (finding that subscribing to meritocracy beliefs has significant positive
psychological effects, but that these effects are lesser—and sometimes even
reversed—in racial minorities).
100. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 23, 44; Jost et al., supra
note 98, at 25–26; Levy et al., supra note 98, at 75–76; Major & Schmader, supra note 98, at 182; see also Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., American Moral
Exceptionalism, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYS-
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Given the overwhelming pervasiveness of meritocracy beliefs in American society, it would be surprising if these beliefs
did not have some effect on Americans’ perceptions of events in
the world around them. And indeed, the psychological literature (led by a vein of research called System Justification Theory or SJT) has made clear that world-view beliefs like meritocracy can have a profound effect on people’s interpretations of
particular events, and the extent to which they perceive them
101
as unfair or justified. Psychology scholars have demonstrated,
for example, that people often develop meritocracy-consistent
explanations for why a particular group is more successful than
another (often by blaming or negatively stereotyping the rela102
Similarly, studies have shown
tively unsuccessful group).
that people often ignore relevant data that suggest that meritocratic principles are being violated (including by—at times—
misremembering nonmeritocratic explanations as being more
103
legitimate than they in fact were).

JUSTIFICATION 27, 32–37 (John T. Jost et al. eds., 2009) (describing the
origins and contemporary manifestations of American meritocracy beliefs).
101. SJT scholars’ principal premise is that people are psychologically motivated to defend the status quo. As a byproduct of this hypothesis they have
argued that meritocracy beliefs (and other similar constructs) are often developed in order to justify current inequalities. These beliefs, in turn, play a substantial role in the process whereby individuals perceive a particular set of
events as fair and justified. See, e.g., John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 262–63 (2005). For a good general overview of
the SJT literature and findings, see generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy,
and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119 (2006); John T. Jost et al., A Decade
of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004).
102. For example, SJT scholars have found that depending on which of two
groups is experimentally manipulated to be characterized as more successful,
people will characterize the “successful” group as more intelligent, hard working, etc., and the less “successful” group as less intelligent, lazier, etc. See, e.g.,
Blasi & Jost, supra note 101, at 1134 –35; John T. Jost & Diana Burgess, Attitudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System Justification
Motives in Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293,
297–300 (2000). This result holds even where people are themselves a part of
the experimentally designated “unsuccessful” group, showing the ability of
“unsuccessful” or subordinated groups to internalize the assumption that meritocracy-based explanations (rather than discrimination or simple unfairness)
are responsible. Blasi & Jost, supra note 101, at 1134 –35; Jost & Burgess, supra, at 297–300.
103. For example, SJT scholars have shown that people misremember a
meritocracy-violating explanation as more legitimate or meritocratic than it
TEM
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All this has led scholars of the perception of discrimination
to hypothesize that one of the factors leading to resistance to
making attributions to discrimination may be the psychological
tension between meritocracy beliefs and recognizing particular
104
events as discrimination. For obvious reasons, discrimination—particularly if it is perceived to be common or systematic—calls into question the veracity of meritocratic belief sys105
Simply put, if minorities, women, and other
tems.
disadvantaged groups are regularly denied opportunities on the
basis of reasons other than their effort and abilities, then we do
not live in a meritocracy. Moreover, unlike isolated and individualistic meritocracy-violating events (such as a particular
person being an unfair and arbitrary distributor of rewards),
discrimination has the potential to pose a much more substantial challenge to meritocratic beliefs, insofar as it suggests a
systematic disadvantaging of particular classes of individu-

actually was at a rate of roughly 33%. See Elizabeth L. Haines & John T. Jost,
Placating the Powerless: Effects of Legitimate and Illegitimate Explanation on
Affect, Memory, and Stereotyping, 13 SOC. JUST. RES. 219, 231 (2000). In contrast, people given a meritocracy-affirming explanation misremembered getting a meritocracy-violating explanation at a rate of only 3%. Id.
104. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Hafer & Becky L. Choma, Belief in a Just World,
Perceived Fairness, and Justification of the Status Quo, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, supra note 100,
at 107, 108–13; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
801, 806–12 (2006); Sharon K. McCoy & Brenda Major, Priming Meritocracy
and the Psychological Justification of Inequality, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 341, 341–42 (2007); Laurie T. O’Brien et al., Understanding White
Americans’ Perceptions of Racism in Hurricane Katrina-Related Events, 12
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 431, 432–33 (2009). It may also be
that meritocracy beliefs directly lead to fewer attributions to discrimination
because they cause people to be more likely to perceive events as based on
merit, rather than unfair outcomes. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Perceived
Discrimination as Worldview Threat or Worldview Confirmation: Implications
for Self-Esteem, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1068, 1081 (2007) [hereinafter Major et al., Perceived Discrimination as Worldview Threat]; Brenda
Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination: The Role of Group Status and
Legitimating Ideology, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 269, 270–71
(2002) [hereinafter Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination].
105. O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 432; see also Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 53–54; Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane
Katrina Racialized Explanations as a System Threat: Implications for Whites’
and Blacks’ Racial Attitudes, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 192, 193–94 (2008) [hereinafter Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina].
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106

als. Thus, there are significant reasons to believe that accusations of discrimination should trigger the types of responses
(such as denial and victim blame) that have been welldocumented in the context of other threats to meritocratic principles, and that these responses will translate into fewer at107
tributions to discrimination.
Considerable experimental support has been gathered for
this theoretical perspective over the last decade. Most strikingly, a series of studies have directly tested the theory that meritocratic beliefs are inversely related to attributions to discrimination, and have found that such beliefs do in fact lead people
108
to make significantly fewer attributions to discrimination.
While some of these studies have employed correlational methods that are causally hard to interpret (showing only that those
with higher meritocracy beliefs make fewer attributions to discrimination), others have employed much more nuanced psychological methods to tease out the causal influence of meritocracy beliefs. For example, a number of scholars have
109
demonstrated that even when people are primed subcon-

106. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina, supra note 105, at 193–94;
Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Interpersonally
Costly? A Test of System- and Group-Justifying Motivations, 32 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1523, 1528 (2006) [hereinafter Kaiser et al., Why Are
Attributions to Discrimination Costly].
107. See, e.g., Hafer & Choma, supra note 104, at 108–13; Kaiser & Major,
supra note 104, at 808–12; O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 432–33; see also
Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 55–56; Kaiser et al., Why
Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 1524.
108. See, e.g., Hafer & Choma, supra note 104; Kaiser & Major, supra note
104, at 808–12; Major & Schmader, supra note 98, at 185–89; Major et al.,
Perceiving Personal Discrimination, supra note 104, at 275, 278, 281; McCoy &
Major, supra note 104, at 346, 350–51; see also Isaac M. Lipkus & Ilene C.
Siegler, The Belief in a Just World and Perceptions of Discrimination, 127 J.
PSYCHOL. 465, 473 (1993) (finding that higher scores on the “Belief in a Just
World” scale correlated with lower perceptions of individual discrimination).
Interestingly, research has shown that members of high status groups (such
as white men) who are rejected in favor of a minority group member are more
likely to believe they have been subject to discrimination where they have high
meritocracy beliefs. See, e.g., Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination,
supra note 104, at 275, 278, 281. This result makes sense, as strong meritocracy beliefs may lead individuals to believe that minority groups are genuinely
inferior, and thus that outcomes favoring such groups must not be based on
merit principles.
109. For those not familiar with priming, it is a technique often used in the
psychological literature to subconsciously activate a particular psychological
construct, which inter alia allows a more direct evaluation of its causal effects.
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sciously to think about meritocratic ideals, they make fewer at110
tributions to discrimination than a control group. Thus, even
a task as simple as unscrambling words to form meritocracy111
in advance of making assessments of
related sentences
whether discrimination has occurred causes people to make
112
significantly fewer attributions to discrimination.
Further support for the hypothesized causal influence of a
conflict between meritocracy beliefs and attributions to discrimination has come from an array of studies that have looked at
the extent to which observers display classic psychological
threat response signs (e.g., signs of agitation or anxiety) when
113
exposed to allegations of discrimination. In effect, psychology
scholars have tested the theory that attributions to discrimination are perceived as a threat to many individuals’ core beliefs
by examining the existence of well-known manifestations of
psychological threat conditions—such as negative feelings (in114
cluding anxiety and distress), victim blame, and “in-group”
115
bolstering—upon exposure to accusations of discrimination.

110. See, e.g., Kaiser & Major, supra note 104, at 811; McCoy & Major, supra note 104, at 346.
111. For example, the words presented to a subject might be “Life Work
Gets Hard You in Ahead,” which unscrambles to “Hard Work Gets You Ahead
in Life.”
112. See, e.g., Kaiser & Major, supra note 104, at 811; McCoy & Major, supra note 104, at 346.
113. See infra notes 114, 117–26 and accompanying text. For additional
studies with results supportive of the meritocracy-threat hypothesis, see, for
example, Cheryl R. Kaiser & Jennifer S. Pratt-Hyatt, Distributing Prejudice
Unequally: Do Whites Direct Their Prejudice Towards Strongly Identified Minorities?, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 442 (2009) (showing that
strongly identified racial minorities are derogated more by individuals who
strongly endorse meritocracy beliefs, apparently because they are assumed to
lack shared beliefs in meritocracy ideals); Levy et al., supra note 98, at 79, 81
(showing that although African Americans’ endorsement of meritocracy beliefs
declined in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, apparently partially in response to
perceptions of discrimination, they rebounded relatively quickly). There is also
an interesting body of research from the affirmative action context that is
supportive of the meritocracy-threat hypothesis. See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby et
al., Understanding Affirmative Action, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 599–600
(2006); Donna M. Garcia et al., Opposition to Redistributive Employment Policies for Women: The Role of Policy Experience and Group Interest, 44 BRIT. J.
OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 595–96 (2005).
114. The term “in-group” is used in psychology and sociology to refer to social groups that one identifies with as a member. The term “out-group” is used
to refer to groups that one does not belong to and does not identify with.
115. See infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
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As set forth below, the results have been striking—attributions
to discrimination do in fact trigger psychological threat responses—particularly among those who are high endorsers of
meritocracy beliefs or who have been experimentally primed
116
with such beliefs.
Among the most striking findings in this area are that
meritocracy beliefs lead to increased victim blame and derogation in the discrimination context, both phenomena that are
frequently observed when someone experiences a psychological
117
Indeed, Cheryl Kaiser and her colleagues have
“threat.”
demonstrated that people routinely ascribe negative qualities
to individuals who attribute their failure to discrimination (as
compared to some other cause), even in circumstances where
118
discrimination appears to be a virtual certainty. These results, moreover, have been found to be moderated by meritocracy beliefs—those with high meritocracy beliefs are significantly
more likely to engage in victim blame than those with low mer119
itocracy beliefs. Similarly, scholars have found that subtle
priming with meritocracy constructs (via a word scramble or
other method) leads to increased endorsement of negative stereotypes regarding African Americans and other groups that
120
have traditionally been subjected to discrimination.

116. See infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. See generally Aaron C.
Kay et al., Victim Derogation and Victim Enhancement as Alternate Routes to
System Justification, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 240 (2005) (describing the role of victim derogation in managing responses to psychological threats).
118. See, e.g., Donna M. Garcia et al., Perceivers’ Responses to In-Group
and Out-Group Members Who Blame a Negative Outcome on Discrimination,
31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 769, 774 –77 (2005); Kaiser & Major,
supra note 104, at 818–19; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the
Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination,
6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227, 233 –36 (2003); Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 47–50; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T.
Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 258, 261–62 (2001)
[hereinafter Kaiser & Miller, Stop Complaining].
119. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 56–57;
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at
1527, 1531; Major et al., Perceived Discrimination as Worldview Threat, supra
note 104, at 1076.
120. See, e.g., Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive
Structures, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 899–902 (1988); McCoy
& Major, supra note 104, at 349–50.
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In the converse of this victim-blame phenomenon, scholars
have found that attributions to discrimination against outgroup members lead to a defensive reaction, causing people to
121
more strongly embrace their own in-group. Thus, for example,
whites who were shown a video attributing the problems in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to discrimination expressed
significantly more positive feelings towards other whites than a
group shown a video attributing Katrina’s problems to simple
122
incompetence. Relatedly, scholars have found that receiving
an affirmation treatment, designed to lessen anxieties and increase self-esteem, significantly increases white observers’ will123
ingness to describe a particular set of facts as discrimination.
Both of these findings suggest that defensive reactions may
play some role in majority group resistance to making attributions to discrimination, a conclusion that is buttressed by research showing that individuals are much less likely to characterize behaviors as discriminatory in circumstances that might
be self-implicating (i.e., where they themselves have engaged in
124
similar behaviors).
A final key piece of evidence that attributions to discrimination are perceived as psychologically threatening to meritocracy beliefs comes from experiments evaluating the emotional
response of observers who are exposed to a minority group
member making an attribution to discrimination. Along a significant array of affect-related criteria—including anxiousness,
nervousness, and distress—the extent of endorsement of meritocracy beliefs has been found to moderate the extent of psychological discomfort or distress that observers experience when
faced with an attribution to discrimination (or, put another
way, those who are higher endorsers of meritocracy beliefs experience significantly greater psychological distress when faced
125
with attributions to discrimination). Moreover, priming studies have demonstrated that even where a subject is simply
121. See supra note 118.
122. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina, supra note 105, at 199 tbl.1.
123. See, e.g., Glenn Adams et al., The Effect of Self-Affirmation on Perception of Racism, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 616, 621–22 (2006).
124. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About
White Racists: What Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 133 (2006).
125. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54 –55;
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at
1533–34.
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primed with meritocracy beliefs, and is not a fortiori a strong
endorser of such beliefs, they experience significantly greater
psychological distress when faced with accusations of discrimi126
nation than their nonprimed counterparts.
There is, then, substantial support for the conclusion that
attributions to discrimination are in tension with meritocracy
beliefs, and that this dynamic contributes to many people’s reluctance to make robust attributions to discrimination. In the
following Section, I turn to a discussion of how cognitive factors
influence attributions to discrimination.
2. The Influence of Cognitive Factors on Attributions to
127
Discrimination
Although the precise theories differ in their terminology
and specifics, it is well-established in the field of psychology
that the human process of making judgments is shortcut-laden,
and is not comprehensively rational in its analysis of potential128
ly relevant information. We simply do not have the cognitive
126. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54 –55;
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at
1534.
127. I have omitted here a discussion of one of the cognitive factors that
undoubtedly plays a large role in people’s failure to detect discrimination in
individual circumstances prior to litigation. Specifically, psychology scholars
have found very substantial evidence to support the conclusion that people
have much greater difficulties discerning discrimination in disorganized information than in information that provides systematic comparisons. Thus,
people are much less likely to make attributions to discrimination where they
are presented with information in a format that does not make it easy to compare outcomes across groups (for example, information presented in the disordered multi-page form it would likely be maintained in an employers’ files, as
opposed to in a compiled chart). See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby & Alison M. Konrad,
Affirmative Action in Employment, 10 DIVERSITY FACTOR 3, 5 (2002); Faye
Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination: The Importance of Format, 14 SEX ROLES 637, 642, 644 –46 (1986); see also Christel
G. Rutte, Organization of Information and the Detection of Gender Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 226, 229–30 (1994). Given that the prelitigation presentation of information is likely to be highly unorganized (if indeed comparator
information is even available), this phenomenon undoubtedly plays a significant role in causing much discrimination to go undetected in our society. I
have omitted a full discussion of this phenomenon here, as it is difficult to
know what if any causal valence it has in relation to actual litigation outcomes, without having a better understanding of whether plaintiffs’ attorneys
do or do not typically do a good job of obtaining and organizing information as
part of the litigation process.
128. For an excellent and accessible overview of many of the pertinent concepts, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
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capacity to undergo a full evaluation of all information we have
ever received de novo each time we are presented with a new
129
judgment-demanding situation. One feature of this necessary
cognitive conservativeness is that our existing understandings
of the world have a substantial influence on how we interpret in130
coming information, particularly in ambiguous circumstances.
There are a number of specific ways that established understandings can impact the interpretation of information in a
particular factual scenario. Among the most well-documented is
the tendency for people to rely on their existing mental prototypes as a basis for making judgments in a new factual con131
text. In essence, people will compare incoming data against
their existing cognitive template to see if they are a match—if
there are too many dissimilarities, that template will be rejected as a potential explanation, and the search for another will
132
begin. For example, a person may assess whether or not a
particular object is a table by comparing it to his or her mental
template of “table”: legs, flat surface, etc. More complexly, a
person may make initial judgments about whether a person is
an authority figure by accessing his or her mental template for
“authority figure”; a template that may include tone of voice,
posture, and for some people, race and sex. The process of making judgments thus becomes one of comparing salient features
of an existing template and the situation currently demanding
133
interpretation, and judging the extent of similarity.
A similar, but distinct, phenomenon has been found in
people’s reliance on what is referred to in the psychology field
as “cognitive accessibility” as an indicator of the likelihood that
a particular causal explanation is correct. For all of us, differing explanations for particular outcomes are more or less “cognitively accessible,” i.e., more or less likely to come to mind
134
when faced with a particular situation. This depends on a
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188–90, 1199–1211 (1995).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 161, 163, 166 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K.
Srull eds., 1984).
132. Id. at 166–71.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153–55 (4th ed.
2008).
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host of factors, including the extent to which particular explanations are generally perceived to be common occurrences (e.g.,
a general belief that discrimination is relatively common) or
have been recently accessed mentally (e.g., a recent experience
135
with a set of events that were perceived as discriminatory).
Accessibility is in turn interpreted by most people as an indicator of the actual likelihood that the explanation is correct, such
that cognitively accessible explanations are perceived to be
more likely to be correct, whereas cognitively inaccessible ex136
planations are perceived as less likely to be correct.
Both of these well-established cognitive phenomena have
obvious potential implications for the perception of discrimination. To the extent that most people have preexisting cognitive
prototypes for what constitutes “discrimination,” cognitive psychology research suggests that these prototypes should have a
substantial influence on the extent to which particular events
are judged to be discrimination. Similarly, research on cognitive accessibility suggests that the extent to which discrimination is a more (or less) cognitively accessible explanation for
negative outcomes than other potential causes (such as a lack
of effort or ability on the part of the victim) may have a significant impact on whether people make judgments of discrimination in particular contexts.
The first of these concepts—the notion that cognitive prototypes play a role in how people make judgments of discrimination—is by now well-accepted among scholars of the perception
of discrimination. Across a wide variety of contexts, psychology
scholars have demonstrated that people do in fact have cognitive templates of what constitutes discrimination (although
these templates may vary from person to person), and that these templates profoundly influence the interpretation of a par137
ticular set of events as discriminatory or nondiscriminatory.
Thus, if significant features of an evaluator’s cognitive proto-

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94 –98; Laurie T. O’Brien et
al., How Status and Stereotypes Impact Attributions to Discrimination: The
Stereotype-Asymmetry Hypothesis, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 405, 405–06
(2008); O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 439; see also Barrett & Swim, supra
note 92 ( providing an excellent overview of the ways in which cognitive factors
may influence attributions to discrimination); infra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
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type of discrimination are missing or incongruent in the factual
scenario presented to them, the evaluator generally will not
138
make attributions to discrimination.
So what are the features of most people’s cognitive templates of discrimination? Although any number of cognitive
prototypes undoubtedly exist across the population, the cognitive prototype that appears to be commonly applied by most
people is a relatively narrow one of fairly explicit classic dis139
parate treatment. Thus, psychologists have found, for example, that:
 People’s cognitive prototype of discrimination, and hence
their willingness to make attributions to discrimination,
is dependent on the existence of very strong and explicit
evidence of invidious intent. Thus, even where victims
are significantly harmed, if there is no intent (or even
ambiguous intent) people are very reluctant to make at140
tributions to discrimination.
 People generally also consider harm to be a prototypical
element of discrimination, and are far less likely to make
attributions to discrimination in circumstances where
there is ambiguous harm to the victim (e.g., “benevolent
sexism”) or in which the actor’s intentions are unambig141
uously invidious but there is no obvious tangible harm.
 Stereotypical perpetrator/victim dyads feature prominently in many people’s prototypes of discrimination,
such that unequal treatment perpetrated by a member of
the same minority group, or by a minority group member

138. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94 –98; see also infra notes
138–43 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 437; Sommers & Norton,
supra note 124, at 132.
140. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98; Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 958–59; see also Foster & Dion, supra
note 88 (showing that individuals generally did not perceive discrimination in
a disparate impact context); Kappen & Branscombe, supra note 89, at 300, 302
(same).
141. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98; Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951; see also Swim et al., Judgments of
Sexism, supra note 92, at 408–10; Barrett & Swim, supra note 92, at 22.
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against a majority group member, is generally less likely
142
to be attributed to discrimination.
 The prototype of a victim of discrimination is one who
does not have control over his or her stigmatized status,
such that victims who are perceived as having control
are significantly less likely to be found to have been sub143
jected to discrimination.
There is also developing (albeit less fully matured) evidence for the conclusion that the cognitive accessibility of discrimination as compared to other explanations also plays a role
in judgments of discrimination. Specifically, several scholars
have found that people’s background understandings of how
common or rare discrimination is significantly influences
whether or not they make attributions to discrimination in particular factual contexts (with those who have higher preexisting
expectancies of the incidence of discrimination being more like144
ly to find discrimination in any given context). This finding is
consistent with the conclusion that the explanation of discrimination is relatively cognitively accessible for those who believe
discrimination to be relatively widespread, and that, conversely, discrimination is relatively cognitively inaccessible for those
145
who believe discrimination to be rare. Whether or not one
subscribes to a cognitive accessibility interpretation, it is clear
that background understandings of the commonality of discrim-

142. See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 93, at 236; Inman & Baron, supra
note 55, at 732; Krumm & Corning, supra note 93, at 1110–11 (2008); Major &
Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98.
143. See, e.g., Blaine & Williams, supra note 95, at 83; Crocker et al., supra
note 95, at 66; Major et al., supra note 51, at 288–89; Major & Sawyer, supra
note 7, at 98; see also sources cited supra notes 95–96.
144. See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 93, at 237; Barrett & Swim, supra
note 92, at 24; James D. Johnson et al., Predicting Perceived Racism and Acceptance of Negative Behavioral Intergroup Responses: Validating the JLS in a
College and Community Sample of Blacks, 40 PERSONALITY & INDIV. DIFFERENCES 421, 427 (2006); Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 96–97; see also Jon
Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of
Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 764 –65 (2005)
(showing that racial divides in the perceived fairness of the criminal justice
system have a large impact on the interpretation of ambiguously discriminatory incidents).
145. For example, it is reasonable to assume that discrimination will be a
cognitively more accessible explanation for negative outcomes if discrimination is perceived as a common phenomenon in today’s society.
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ination significantly influence attributions to discrimination in
146
individual circumstances.
So do most people believe discrimination to be relatively
rare or common? The answer varies significantly across groups,
with majority group members (i.e., white males) being highly
147
likely to subscribe to a “discrimination is rare” view. African
Americans are more likely to subscribe to a “discrimination is
common” view, as are (to a somewhat lesser extent) members of
other historically disadvantaged groups (such as women and
148
people with disabilities). Thus, there are reasons to believe
that different groups may respond differently to particular factual scenarios when asked to assess whether or not discrimination has occurred (a phenomenon that has considerable empirical support), and that the groups that predominate on the
federal judiciary are among the least likely to make attribu149
tions to discrimination.
Interestingly, both of the foregoing cognitive phenomena
are a fortiori content-neutral vis-à-vis whether or not they are
likely to be helpful or harmful to discrimination claimants. One
can envision, for example, reliance on cognitive prototypes being helpful to discrimination claimants if the prevailing prototype of discrimination was one that embraced (as so many legal
scholars do) anti-subordination principles, or presumed that

146. See sources cited supra note 141.
147. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 49, 63, 185–200; Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 144, at 763; O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 441;
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rate for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511,
561–62 (2003); Robinson, supra note 6, at 1107–17.
148. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 190, 200; Hurwitz &
Peffley, supra note 144, at 763; Robinson, supra note 6, at 1107–17; see also
Avery et al., supra note 93, at 237.
149. A number of studies have found that judges of different groups respond differently in making assessments of discrimination, and that white
male judges are less likely to make such attributions as compared to other
groups. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Judges’ Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 359, 367–71 (2011); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of
the Colorblind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1161 (2009); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759, 1787 (2005); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 313, 343–44 (2012).

2012]

LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

1317

any individual who has fulfilled the McDonnell Douglas requirements has proven discrimination. Similarly, if popular
opinion (particularly of those on the bench) widely subscribed
to the view that discrimination remains common in our society,
the relative cognitive accessibility of discrimination as a potential causal explanation would undoubtedly favor plaintiffs.
So what explains the content of widely held prototypes and
beliefs about discrimination? No doubt the media, family, colleagues, and other social networks play a significant role. Psychologists have also developed some support for the conclusion,
however, that meritocracy beliefs (discussed above for their influence on the frequency with which people make attributions
to discrimination in individualized circumstances) also play a
150
role in the broader views of discrimination that people adopt.
The most interesting work in this area has been performed by
Laurie O’Brien, who has shown that meritocracy beliefs significantly influence the extent to which people adopt narrow, disparate treatment models of discrimination (people are much
more likely to do so where they are high endorsers of meritocracy beliefs) as well as the extent to which people believe discrimination is generally widespread (people are more likely to
believe discrimination is rare if they are high endorsers of mer151
itocracy beliefs). While work in this area is still in the developmental stages and many questions remain unanswered, existing research suggests that the various causal factors that
scholars have observed may have significant interrelationships
152
that have yet to be fully explored.
***
In sum, the psychological literature on the perception of
discrimination shows an across-the-board tendency for people
to decline to make attributions to discrimination; a tendency
that is further accentuated outside of the context of explicit
traditional disparate treatment. Psychological scholars have

150. See, e.g., Lipkus & Siegler, supra note 108, at 470; O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 437–39; see also Glenn Adams et al., Perceptions of Racism in
Hurricane Katrina: A Liberation Psychology Analysis, 6 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 215, 219–20, 221–26 (2006) (discussing an array of factors
that may influence prototypes and beliefs about discrimination).
151. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 437–39; see also Lipkus &
Siegler, supra note 108, at 470.
152. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
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found, moreover, considerable experimental support for the
conclusion that this phenomenon is driven by a tension between commonly held beliefs about discrimination and meritocracy and the recognition of discrimination claims. In the following Part, I turn to a discussion of the reasons why these
phenomena provide a likely explanation for the pervasive difficulties that discrimination litigants face in the courts.
III. APPLYING THE FINDINGS OF PSYCHOLOGY
SCHOLARS TO REAL-WORLD DISCRIMINATION
OUTCOMES
As discussed in Part I, many existing theories for why discrimination litigants face adverse outcomes do not fit well with
153
the actual experiences of discrimination litigants. So how do
the findings of psychology scholars (discussed in Part II) fare?
A side-by-side comparison of the findings of psychology scholars
and the experiences of discrimination litigants suggests that
154
extensive and striking overlaps exist between the two arenas.
Indeed, psychology scholars have repeatedly documented phenomena in lay subjects that closely replicate the full range of
experiences of discrimination litigants, even down to the level
155
of relative doctrinal minutiae.

153. See supra notes 34 –50 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Table 1.
155. Id.
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Table 1
Summary: Psychology Studies and Anti-Discrimination Literature

Phenomenon Observed

Psychology Study

Anti-Discrimination
Literature / Case Law

Attributions to discrimination rare, even in
cases of classic disparate treatment.

See sources cited supra
notes 58–82 and accompanying text.

See sources cited supra
notes 37, 41–42 and
accompanying text.

Attributions to discrimination even less likely
where no clear indicia of
traditional
invidious
intent.

Swim et al. (2003); Foster & Dion (2004);
Kappen & Branscombe
(2001)

Bagenstos (2006); Bell
(1985); Siegel (1997);
Flagg (1993)

Differential treatment
based on statuses that
are perceived of as controllable (e.g., sexual
orientation, obesity) unlikely to be perceived as
discriminatory.

Major
&
Sawyer
(2009); Major (2002);
Crocker (1993); Blaine
& Williams (2004);
Weiner (1988); Quist &
Weigand
(2003);
Haider-Markel
&
Joslyn (2008)

(2006);
YOSHINO
Yoshino (2002); Halley
(1994)

Fact patterns that deviate from stereotypical
discrimination “stories”
(e.g.,
minority-onminority discrimination,
discrimination in which
the same actor hires
and fires an employee)
less likely to be perceived as discrimination.

Inman & Baron (1996);
Krumm & Corning
(2008); Major & Sawyer (2009); Avery et al.
(2008)

Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, 523
U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (describing the reluctance
of lower courts to recognize same-sex harassment as discrimination); Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d
651, 658 (5th Cir.
1995)
(describing
same-actor
inference
which views with skepticism claims of dis-
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Anti-Discrimination
Literature / Case Law
crimination where the
hiring and firing manager was the same)

Findings of discrimination rare where the alleged discriminator has
a good faith belief that
did not discriminate
(even where actual basis for actions factually
false and based on stereotypes).

Swim et al. (2003)

Krieger (2004); Krieger
& Fiske (2006)

No finding of sex harassment where harassment at issue is nonsexual ( but nonetheless
sex-based) in nature.

Magley et al. (1999)

Schultz (2006); Schultz
(1998);
Juliano
&
Schwab (2001)

Requirement of actual
harm to the victim in
order to find discrimination.

Swim et al. (2003)

Singeltary v. Missouri
Dep’t of Corrections,
423 F.3d 886, 891–92
(8th Cir. 2005) (describing adverse employment action requirement)

These extensive parallel findings make perfect sense if—as
the findings of psychology scholars suggest—most people are
driven by common background views in making assessments of
whether or not to characterize a particular set of facts as discrimination. Thus, for example, if both judges and lay people
share a common view of discrimination—as a very rare, narrow, and generally explicit phenomena—it is unsurprising that
both in the lab and in the courts, findings of discrimination are
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rare, even where there is relatively strong evidence of invidious
156
discriminatory intent. Similarly, it makes sense that—if people’s shared “template” of discrimination is an act done by majority group members to minorities—both psychology subjects
and judges would be more resistant to making findings of discrimination where the roles are not filled by stereotypical ac157
tors (e.g., minority on minority discrimination).
In contrast, the striking similarities between the findings
of psychology scholars and legal scholars are very difficult to
explain if one assumes that judges and jurors—unlike the lay
people studied in psychology studies—do not draw upon common background views in adjudicating discrimination claims.
Indeed, what else except a common shared conception of “sex
harassment” could explain the strikingly similar reluctance of
both judges and lay people to characterize nonsexual (but sex158
based) harassment as sex harassment? Similarly, it is hard—
if not impossible—to explain why lay subjects in psychology
studies would show a pattern of results comparable to the realworld “good faith, honest belief rule” (developed by judges and
typically applied at summary judgment) unless both derive
from a common shared conception of discrimination as a phenomenon that derives from conscious invidious intent (instead

156. Compare supra notes 58–82 and accompanying text (outlining the extensive support in the psychology literature for the conclusion that people resist making attributions to discrimination), with supra notes 38, 41–42 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that even cases with comparatively strong
evidence of discrimination are often dismissed in litigation).
157. Compare supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing psychological literature demonstrating that research subjects are less likely to
make attributions to discrimination where the perpetrator and victim do not
fit the “classic” discrimination scenario, e.g., majority on minority discrimination), with Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (describing the resistance of the lower courts to characterizing same-sex harassment as discriminatory, and noting that some of the lower courts had
categorically concluded that such harassment was non-actionable).
158. Compare Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual
Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 391–92 (1999) (describing this phenomenon in the psychology study context), with Vicki Schultz, Understanding
Sexual Harassment Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What We Can
Do About It, 29 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 101, 111–28 (2006) (describing
this phenomenon in the courts), and Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1710–738 (1998) (same), and Ann Juliano &
Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 548, 580–82 (2001) (same).
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159

of from subconscious stereotypes).
Thus, the extensive parallels between the findings of psychology scholars and the phenomena observed by legal scholars
in the courts, strongly suggest that common background
views—like those documented by psychology scholars—are
playing a role in the contemporary adjudication of discrimination claims. Indeed, as other leading law and psychology scholars have observed—in the absence of (rarely available) direct
studies on judges or jurors—there are few more persuasive indicators of a common underlying cause than this type of phenomenological overlap between the findings of psychology
160
scholars and the pattern of decisions in the courts. As a result, there are significant reasons to believe that real-world
judges and jurors are—like the lay subjects studied by psychology scholars—influenced by their background views regarding
meritocracy and discrimination in determining what is
discrimination.
This conclusion is buttressed by a wealth of law and psychology studies demonstrating that the findings of psychology
scholars may, in general, provide a helpful indicator of what
types of dynamics are animating judge and juror behavior in
161
real cases. There are two similar but distinct ways that
scholars have explored the likelihood that background beliefs
and other common psychological phenomena are generally influencing real-world cases: (1) in relation to jurors, by comparing results across a wide array of experimental conditions to
see if the study format or population appears to affect the results; and (2) in relation to judges, by testing real-world judges
to see if they behave in a similar manner to lay populations.
The first of these approaches—used predominantly in the
context of jury research—has focused on attempting to replicate

159. Compare Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951,
959 (showing pattern of results among lay subjects that is comparable to the
real-world “good faith, honest belief ” rule), with Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 839
(2004) (describing and critiquing the use of the “good faith, honest belief ” rule
by judges in discrimination litigation), and Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1034 –38 (2006) (same).
160. See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial DecisionMaking, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34 (1998).
161. See infra notes 162–74 and accompanying text.
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experimental results across an array of experimental condi162
tions. Thus, scholars have sought to replicate their findings
with differing populations (typically students vs. a realistic “jury pool” population or real jurors) and across an array of study
designs (ranging from a pencil and paper study design to real163
world trial conditions). These various studies—and a number
of recent works that have compiled prior individualized findings—have thus attempted to examine whether the common
(and unrealistic) conditions in which most mock juror studies
164
are conducted may undermine their “ecological validity” vis165
à-vis real-world jury behavior.
While the results of the foregoing “varied methodology”

162. See infra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
163. See Robert M. Bray et al., The Effects of Defendant Status on the Decisions of Student and Community Jurors, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 256, 258 (1978);
Michael J. Crowley et al., The Juridical Impact of Psychological Expert Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 93
(1994); Rogers Elliott & Robert J. Robinson, Death Penalty Attitudes and the
Tendency to Convict or Acquit: Some Data, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 389, 395–
97 (1991); Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe “Insanity,” 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 48 (1989); Norman J. Finkel et al., Killing
Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 5, 13–14 (1994) [hereinafter Finkel et al., Killing Kids]; Norman J. Finkel
et al., Right to Die, Euthanasia and Community Sentiment: Crossing the Public/Private Boundary, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 495 (1993) [hereinafter
Finkel et al., Right to Die]; Solomon M. Fulero & Norman J. Finkel, Barring
Ultimate Issue Testimony: An “Insane” Rule?, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 495, 500
(1991); Geoffrey Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies and Jury
Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 423 (1990); Douglas J. Narby & Brian L.
Cutler, Effectiveness of Voir Dire as a Safeguard in Eyewitness Cases, 79 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 724, 726–27 (1994); Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 349, 358 (1991); Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror
Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A MetaAnalysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 488 (2006); Douglas J. Zickafoose &
Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 588
(1999); see also Vicki L. Fishfader et al., Evidential and Extralegal Factors in
Juror Decisions: Presentation Mode, Retention, and Level of Emotionality, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 565, 570–71 (1996) (examining the effect of different
presentation modes for a different purpose, but also finding no material differences in outcomes). See generally Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity
of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999)
(collecting the findings of prior studies).
164. In the psychology field, “ecological validity” refers to the extent to
which unrealistic study conditions may influence outcomes, thus rendering
results unreliable in real-world conditions.
165. See sources cited supra note 163.
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studies have not been entirely uniform, they have overwhelmingly produced results supportive of the conclusion that psychology studies, in general, provide a valuable indicator of real166
world jury decision-making. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of studies, scholars have replicated findings with remarkable consistency across a wide array of conditions, ranging
from the very unrealistic (students in a lab) to real-world tri167
als. Thus, while there may be some circumstances in which
psychology studies are unlikely to provide a valid indicator of
real-world juror behavior (for example, student populations appear to be more sympathetic to criminal defendants than agedifferentiated populations, and thus moderately less likely to
make guilty findings in criminal cases), it appears that psychological studies can often provide a useful starting point for un168
derstanding juror behavior.
A similar—but somewhat distinct—approach has been taken by scholars towards assessing whether psychology studies
may provide a helpful way of understanding the behavior of real-world judges. Led by the work of Jeffrey Rachlinski, Andrew
Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, an array of recent studies have
tested populations of real judges for the influence of particular
psychological factors, and have compared those results to pre169
existing data involving lay populations. Thus, like the “varied

166. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
167. See Bornstein, supra note 163, at 76–84; Bray et al., supra note 163,
at 258–59; Crowley et al., supra note 163, at 93; Elliott & Robinson, supra note
163, at 395–97; Finkel & Handel, supra note 163, at 48; Finkel et al., Killing
Kids, supra note 163, at 13–14; Finkel et al., Right to Die, supra note 163, at
495; Fulero & Finkel, supra note 163, at 500; Kramer et al., supra note 163, at
423; Narby & Cutler, supra note 163, at 726–27; Roberts & Golding, supra
note 163, at 358; Steblay et al., supra note 163, at 488; Zickafoose & Bornstein, supra note 163, at 586.
168. See, e.g., Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 170, 173–74 (1996); Bornstein, supra note 163, at 78–79; Rita James
Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench,
the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 322 (1971). See generally supra note 167 and accompanying text (demonstrating that remarkably
similar results are achieved across an array of study conditions, from the realistic to the non-realistic).
169. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind]; Chris
Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., The
Hidden Judiciary]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
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methodology” studies described above (used in the context of
assessing jury behavior), the work of Rachlinski and his colleagues has attempted to provide a mechanism for gaining insight into whether real-world judges are typically subject to the
same types of influences that have been documented by psy170
chology scholars in lay subjects.
While research assessing real-world judges is newer—and
thus less complete—than the research that has been conducted
in the jury context, existing findings from the judge context also strikingly support the conclusion that most of the time psychology studies will provide a helpful basis for understanding
171
real-world adjudicative behavior. Indeed, Rachlinski and his
colleagues have identified a wide array of areas of overlap—and
very few areas of divergence—between the factors that influence real-world judges and those that have been previously
172
found to influence lay populations. Even in contexts where it
seems likely that judges would be highly motivated to avoid
behaving like lay populations (for example, studies of racial
stereotypes or biases), judges quite regularly (albeit not uniformly) show very similar behavior to the behavior documented
173
in lay populations of psychology subjects. It appears, then,
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) [hereinafter
Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Racial Bias]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006) [hereinafter
Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind]; Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005); see also Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: 1. The Effects of Mortality Salience on
Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 681, 682–83, 688 (1989) (finding that both judges and lay populations responded in accordance with “terror management theory” and thus
recommended higher penalties for a moral transgressor when reminded of
their own mortality).
170. See supra note 169.
171. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 169, at
787–805; Guthrie et al., The Hidden Judiciary, supra note 169, at 1501–09,
1512–16; Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 169, at 1210–
11; Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 169, at 1233–37,
1240–41; Rosenblatt et al., supra note 169, at 682–83; Wistrich et al., supra
note 169, at 1251–52, 1286–93; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating
Juries By Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 469, 502 (2005) (finding that judges typically behave similarly to lay jurors across an array of contexts).
173. The most striking example of this is found in a study that Jeffrey
Rachlinski and his colleagues conducted testing a population of judges for sub-
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that judges—like the rest of us—are significantly influenced by
their background beliefs and other common psychological fac174
tors in making adjudicative assessments.
Thus, the work of law and psychology scholars provides
significant reasons to believe that psychology studies will often
provide a quite accurate indicator of the type of dynamics that
are influencing real-world judges and jurors. While real-world
judges and jurors do sometimes diverge in the extent to which
they are influenced by factors that have been previously experimentally demonstrated in lay populations, they more common-

conscious racial biases (often referred to as “implicit biases”). It is clear that
many of the judicial participants in the study were aware that the study was
likely to be subjected to public scrutiny, as many participants were unwilling
to even disclose the jurisdiction in which they adjudicated cases ( presumably
out of a fear of identification or backlash). Nevertheless, Rachlinski and his
colleagues found that judges displayed implicit racial biases at roughly the
same rates as the general population. See Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 169, at 1205, 1210–11.
174. Notably, one need not believe that judges are consciously abandoning
their obligation towards neutral law-based adjudication in order to credit the
results found by Rachlinski and his colleagues. Background views—and most
other psychological phenomena—typically exercise their influence outside of
the framework of conscious awareness. Thus, even a painstakingly conscientious judge may be unaware of the role that background beliefs and other psychological factors are playing in his or her decision-making. Moreover, even if
a judge is aware of the possible influence of his or her background beliefs in a
particular case, he or she will have no way of knowing how to adjust his or her
approach, other than perhaps by taking a painstaking approach to consideration of the facts and/or law (an approach that psychology scholars have documented does appear to make some difference in limiting the influence of mental templates and other background beliefs). See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31–
43 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench] (discussing methods of inducing deliberation and reducing the influence of psychological biases
in judging); see also Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837,
897–902 (2009) (discussing ways that judges may be able to reduce the effects
of cognitive illiberalism); cf. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 17–46), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777104 (suggesting
strategies that might reduce the influence of background beliefs on the adjudication of labor and employment claims). In contrast, a judge cannot simply attempt to “correct” for the possible influence of background beliefs, since the
fact that a judge may be predisposed to make defendant-favorable (or conversely plaintiff-favorable) findings, does not mean that in the particular case
being adjudicated that the judge should deviate from his or her predisposition.
Cf. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra, at 29–30 (noting that intuitive
decision-making can sometimes produce more efficient while equally accurate
decisions).
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175

ly show a striking overlap with existing findings. Moreover,
the unrealistic format in which psychology studies are conducted appears to have surprisingly little influence on outcomes, at
least among mock juror populations (this feature has not—
perhaps because of the relative newness of studies on judges—
176
been studied in judges to date).
Thus, it appears that, as a general matter, psychology
studies can provide a helpful starting point for understanding
the results that we see in the courts. When coupled with the extensive overlap between the findings of psychology scholars and
real-world outcomes in the courts in the discrimination area
these findings provide a strong basis for believing that the
types of background beliefs discussed in Part II are likely influencing real-world discrimination outcomes.
IV. REFORM BY OTHER MEANS? IMPLICATIONS OF A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT FOR EFFORTS TO
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS DISCRIMINATION
There are, then, substantial reasons to believe that the difficult odds faced by discrimination litigants arise at least in
part from commonly shared American background beliefs. Indeed, existing evidence strongly suggests that judges and jurors
are influenced by their background beliefs about discrimination
and the meritocratic foundations of our society; and that these
beliefs tend to lead to adverse outcomes for discrimination
claimants. Thus, while further research is required to confirm
the influence of background beliefs on real-world outcomes in
discrimination cases, it is worth taking seriously the possibility
that such beliefs are an important driver of the difficult odds
that discrimination litigants face. What are the implications of
taking seriously this type of an account?
While a complete answer to this question is beyond the
177
scope of this Article, it is possible to identify for initial discus-

175. See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text.
177. For example, how—if at all—litigants can or should call to the attention of judges the possibility that background beliefs of the kind described by
psychologists are influencing their decision-making in discrimination cases is
a complex question, beyond the scope of my discussion here. Similarly, I do not
elaborate on the implications of the findings of psychology scholars for attempts to answer important empirical questions in the field of discrimination
law, including most notably the role of merit in adverse discrimination out-
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sion several of the most important implications here. First, as
elaborated below, the findings of psychology scholars—which
point to widely held background beliefs as an important cause
of the difficulties faced by discrimination litigants—strongly
suggest the need to rethink prevalent scholarly approaches to
anti-discrimination reform. Indeed, crediting the findings of
psychology scholars, both of the most commonly suggested
types of reform seem likely to have significant limitations as
mechanisms for meaningfully improving outcomes for discrimi178
nation litigants.
Second—as a corollary of this first point—it may be necessary to think creatively about how we can improve outcomes for
putative victims of discrimination. As set forth below, one possible alternative, which has been rarely addressed in the legal
literature to date, would be to make increased use of approaches that do not focus on group-based discrimination claims (e.g.,

comes. Finally, I do not attempt to answer (although I briefly touch on, infra
note 178) the deeper philosophical questions that the findings of psychology
scholars raise—such as whether, in a democracy, it is appropriate (or even desirable) for the widespread views of the public regarding what “is” discrimination to find expression in the day to day adjudication of individual legal cases.
178. Of course, the question of whether the profoundly low success rates
that discrimination litigants currently face should be improved, or are instead
appropriate (either because they reflect an actual lack of discrimination or because they are congruent with public beliefs), is itself deeply contested. A full
exploration of this question is well beyond the scope of this Article. However, it
is worth observing that particularly in the area of discrimination—where the
groups who are the intended beneficiaries of the law are likely to have divergent views from the general population regarding the merits of the claims that
are being dismissed—there may be profound legitimacy concerns about permitting the continuation of a regime that with near-universality rejects the
claims that are being made under the law (and that overwhelmingly relies on
judge-effectuated procedural devices as the mechanism for doing so). See, e.g.,
Robinson, supra note 6, at 1106–17 (describing extensive evidence of minority/majority gaps in perceptions of discrimination); see also Kahan et al., supra
note 174, at 881–87, 895–97 (describing the legitimacy concerns that are
raised by courts summarily dismissing claims that an identifiable section of
society would perceive as meritorious); Burbank Letter, supra note 42, at 11–
12 (noting that the behavior of judges in the employment discrimination context may be an example of the type of cognitive illiberalism described by
Kahan, supra). The remedy I propose in this Article—increased use of approaches that in some way remediate discrimination, but that ask a distinct
liability question—can be seen as a compromise approach, insofar as it could
potentially improve outcomes for putative victims of discrimination while not
requiring the adoption of a legal regime that is deeply divergent from most
people’s beliefs about what discrimination “is.” See infra Part IV.B.
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just-cause claims or Family and Medical Leave Act claims).
Indeed, such “extra-discrimination remedies” (EDRs)—because
of their independence from commonly held understandings of
“discrimination”—seem uniquely situated to avoid many of the
difficulties that discrimination litigants have faced in bringing
discrimination claims.
A. THE LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO REFORM
Legal scholars have traditionally focused on doctrinal reform of the anti-discrimination laws as the leading remedy for
180
the perceived limitations of the anti-discrimination regime.
Across a wide array of contexts over the span of decades, legal
scholars have repeatedly turned to doctrinal reform recommendations (often to be judicially effectuated, although sometimes
requiring legislative action) as the centerpiece of their recommendations for improving outcomes for discrimination liti-

179. There is a robust literature addressing individually many of the nongroup-based claims I discuss here, but relatively little that has looked globally
at such claims as an alternative to the anti-discrimination laws. But cf. Jessica
A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1240–51 (2011) (discussing the general movement towards universalized claims as opposed to discrimination-focused claims in
employment law, and offering a number of critiques of this move). For a few of
the works that have looked at just-cause regimes specifically as an alternative
to the discrimination laws, see, for example, Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of
Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 100–07 (2008); Ann C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1509–24 (1996). For a
discussion of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as an alternative to
traditional discrimination-law approaches (and an argument that it is superior
for effectuating certain types of change), see Catherine Albiston, Institutional
Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1157–65.
180. It would be impossible to catalog here the many thoughtful recommendations for doctrinal reform of the anti-discrimination laws that have been
put forward in the last several decades. For a few recent examples, see, for example, Krieger & Fiske, supra note 159, at 1052–60; Sullivan, The Phoenix,
supra note 35, at 192–97 (2009); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 46–92 (2005); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
355–56, 387 (1987) (recommending doctrinal reform suggestions as a partial
solution, but also acknowledging the practical difficulties that would exist in
implementing doctrinal reform suggestions); Robinson, supra note 6, at 1152–
70; (same); and compare Gelbach et al., supra note 6, at 847–48 (discussing the
possibility of doctrinal reform as a solution, but also noting the potential risks
of such an approach).
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181

gants. These doctrinal reform recommendations—while often
carefully researched and persuasively reasoned—have very
182
rarely been put into practice. Moreover, even where doctrinal
reforms have been adopted, they appear to have had a relatively minimal impact on the outcome of most discrimination
183
claims. Thus, despite decades of thoughtful scholarly proposals, discrimination litigants today remain subject to extremely difficult odds, with a substantially lower likelihood of
184
success than virtually any other category of federal litigants.
These results are unsurprising from the perspective of a
psychological account of the current limitations of antidiscrimination law. Indeed, taking a psychological account seriously, it seems highly likely that the very same belief systems
that have limited individual discrimination litigants’ chances
for success will effectively impede efforts to convince judges
and/or legislators to adopt substantial doctrinal reforms of the
anti-discrimination laws. If a judge or legislator does not see a
specific set of facts as discrimination, there is little reason to
believe that he or she will be willing to adopt a doctrinal reform
185
designed to codify such an understanding as binding law.
Thus, for many of the same reasons discussed in Part II, it
181. See supra note 180.
182. There are several notable exceptions. For example, it is widely
acknowledged that modern sexual harassment doctrine owes much of a debt to
the academic work of Catherine MacKinnon, among others. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)); Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer as Censor, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 913, 926 (1991); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 237–38 (2d ed. 1999). For a recent essay by Catherine
MacKinnon criticizing existing sex discrimination doctrine, see Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2011).
183. See supra Part I. In addition to the exceptions discussed above, supra
note 182, it seems likely that the addition of a right to a jury trial in the 1991
Civil Rights Act resulted in some improvement in trial outcomes for discrimination litigants. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note
27, at 116, 130–31 (documenting that discrimination litigants consistently fare
better in jury trials than in bench trials).
184. See supra Part I.
185. Catherine Albiston has made a very similar observation in the context
of examining the ways that widespread and entrenched norms regarding what
work “is” shape the scope of discrimination protections that judges are willing
to afford. See Albiston, supra note 179, at 1128–57; cf. Bagenstos, supra note
35, at 44 –45 (discussing the problems that entrenched judicial views of the
meaning of discrimination hold for many contemporary proposals to address
structural discrimination).
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seems unlikely that most truly significant doctrinal reforms of
the anti-discrimination laws will be adopted in the first
186
instance.
Perhaps even more significantly, taking a psychological account seriously calls into doubt whether even “successful” doctrinal reforms (i.e., those adopted by a court or legislature) will
have the intended effects of significantly improving outcomes
187
for discrimination litigants. In many, albeit certainly not all,
cases there will be room for even a conscientious judge or juror
to reach more than one result, even where a particular doctrinal loophole has been closed or a particular reform has been ef188
fectuated. This capaciousness of possibilities is not systematically problematic, if one assumes that judges and jurors in fact
behave as idealized adjudicators, with no common directional
biases. While one case may go against a discrimination litigant,
186. For example, one of the most obvious potential reforms of the antidiscrimination laws, institution of a “pretext only” regime (i.e., a regime in
which a finding of discrimination is required where a prima facie case and pretext have been proven), has been legislatively attempted, but has failed to
achieve significant levels of support. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of
Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 239 (1997); see also infra note 248 (discussing further the
possibility of using a “pretext only regime). See generally Michael Z. Green,
Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 952–53 (2005) (noting
that all efforts to amend Title VII during the fourteen-year time frame between the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 2005 had failed).
187. There are significant selection effects problems with trying to rigorously measure the impact of particular doctrinal reforms, since such doctrinal
reforms typically also result in an increased number of claims. To the extent
that scholars have endeavored to do so in the discrimination law context, they
have typically not found statistically significant effects. See, e.g., Juliano &
Schwab, supra note 158, at 554, 575–77; see also infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the backlash that followed the Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) institution of a much more plaintiff-favorable understanding
of discrimination).
188. This is particularly true of doctrinal reforms that would simply eliminate intermediate burdens on the plaintiff, but that do not place radical structural limitations on judges’ or jurors’ discretion on the ultimate question of
discrimination. So long as the ultimate question remains whether discrimination has occurred (and the decision-maker retains discretion to define what
discrimination is), there is nothing to stop a judge or a juror from finding
against a plaintiff on the ultimate question, as opposed to some intermediate
doctrinal obstacle. The findings of psychology scholars—as well as existing experience to date in the federal courts—strongly suggest that this is likely to be
a significant impediment to improving success rates for discrimination plaintiffs, even where intermediate doctrinal obstacles have been removed.
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another will go against the defense, and the particular reform
will, overall, have its desired result.
If, however—as the findings of psychology scholars suggest—most people are predisposed to minimize the likelihood of
discrimination, the “close calls” are likely to predominantly be
made in a manner unfavorable to discrimination litigants. Over
time, the accretive nature of the law means that results—even
if originally bolstered by a particular doctrinal reform—will ultimately come to resemble roughly the state of affairs that we
currently face, with discrimination litigants facing extremely
189
difficult odds. And in fact, it is precisely this dynamic that
appears to have substantially led to the current state of affairs.
Discrimination law’s “meaning,” abysmal as it is for most discrimination litigants, has not been crafted exclusively, or even
principally, through sweeping anti-plaintiff Supreme Court decisions, but through the multiplicity of plaintiff-unfavorable individualized judgments in the district courts and courts of
190
appeals.
Equally problematically, both psychology and legal scholars have documented that reforms that deviate too far from
prevailing understandings of what constitutes discrimination
(which among most people are fairly restricted) are likely to be
even more directly undercut. For example, as Linda Hamilton
Krieger and others have described, a substantial “sociolegal
backlash” (characterized by, inter alia a disregard of explicit
statutory provisions, of agency guidance, and of legislative history) accompanied the ADA’s enactment, and its pressing of a
191
more expansive legal understanding of discrimination. Psy-

189. This phenomenon roughly resembles what Linda Hamilton Krieger
has referred to as “sociolegal capture.” See Krieger, supra note 35, at 347–51.
190. For a discussion of this issue in the ADA context, see e.g., Mathew
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra
note 35, at 62, 66–72. This phenomenon (i.e., the accretion of plaintiffunfavorable standards through numerous individualized judgments) has significant drawbacks, insofar as it allows important policy choices about what
discrimination is to be obscured under the guise of doctrinal and factual technicalities. This hiding-the-ball approach makes many important choices about
the shape of discrimination law difficult to attack directly, as they are couched
in the language of individualized circumstances, rendering them facially
(while not genuinely) unimportant.
191. Krieger, supra note 35, at 361–82; see also Bagenstos, supra note 35,
at 43 & nn.223–24; Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating
Measures: Judicial Construction of the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH
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chology scholars have documented a similar phenomenon
among lay people, who, for example, report an inability or unwillingness to follow instructions directing them to apply a
“reasonable woman” standard in sexual harassment cases, and
who report confusion and an inability to properly apply instructions that require them to treat disparate impact as a form of
192
discrimination. Thus, more substantial reforms may be limited through more direct retrenchment even if they make it
193
through the initial hurdles to adoption.
There are thus substantial reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of doctrinal reform under a psychological understanding
of the current dynamics of discrimination litigation. Taking seriously such a psychological understanding (and history) suggests that such reforms are—as a general matter—unlikely to
be adopted. Moreover, they seem unlikely, even if adopted, to
result in systematic change. Whether through the slow accretive process of anti-plaintiff results, or through direct backlash,
doctrinally driven efforts to reform the prevailing (and limited)
conception of discrimination seem unlikely (absent accompanying social change) to fundamentally succeed in their transform194
ative project.
So if doctrinal reform of the discrimination laws seems an
unlikely remedy for the current limits of the American antidiscrimination program, what is the alternative? One alternative proposal that has become increasingly popular among legal
scholars in recent years is private institutional reform, effectuAGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 35, at
122, 149–50; Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the
Americans With Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76
TENN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2009).
192. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 6, at 1161; E-Mail from Laurie T.
O’Brien, supra note 90.
193. This phenomenon—i.e., disregarding legal instructions that are contrary to culturally meaningful lay understandings—has also been documented
in other areas of the law. For an excellent discussion of findings on this issue
in the criminal law context as well as a theoretical discussion of the potential
reasons for it, see Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729,
793–97 (2010).
194. While space does not permit full exposition of the normative implications of using doctrinal reform as a method of remedying the difficult odds
that discrimination litigants face, it should be noted that there may also be
significant normative considerations that militate against attempting to use
doctrinal reform as the primary method for attempting to override the influence of widely shared background beliefs.
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ated by and within the very institutions that are the potential
195
situses of discriminatory events (for example, employers).
These recommendations have taken a wide variety of forms,
but have been united in their consensus that many of the intractable problems of contemporary discrimination are a poor
fit for our existing model of judicially enforced discrimination
196
laws. They thus have recommended a turn to private institu197
tional actors as the primary agents of change. For example,
some scholars have suggested that employers be encouraged to
adopt more effective internal systems for detecting and remediating discrimination, or to adopt policies that help avoid “second
generation” employment discrimination problems (such as the
difficulties that women and people with disabilities dispropor198
tionally face in meeting stringent “face time” requirements).
While these more recent institutional reform recommendations are thoughtful and often powerfully argued (as their doctrinal predecessors were), there are obvious and significant obstacles to their success, particularly in their more radical
199
iterations. Most notably, to the extent that scholars proposing

195. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process:
Towards an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment
Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 63–74; Robinson, supra note 6,
at 1170–79; Sturm, supra note 36, at 553–66.
196. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 195, at 30–45, 84 –86; Sturm,
supra note 36, at 475–79.
197. See supra note 195.
198. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 195, at 29–30, 84 –86; Sturm,
supra note 36, at 475–79.
199. I should note that I am not suggesting that civil rights law is ineffective in institutionalizing lower levels of employer discrimination, as compared
to a “no law on the books” regime. Indeed, existing work suggests that providing for formal anti-discrimination protections for particular groups may play a
very important role in reducing discrimination and furthering economic progress for protected groups (although there are often difficulties in measuring
the extent of effects). See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1640–41 (1991) (noting
that results are consistent with the conclusion that civil rights law and enforcement played a major role in African American economic advancement in
the 1960s and 1970s but that other factors, such as improved education, also
played a role). This Part addresses the distinct issue of whether it is realistic
to expect that—to the extent that discrimination persists despite formal legal
protections—institutional reform is likely to provide a particularly effective
vehicle for reform. Cf. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC.
1531, 1567–68 (1992) (discussing the ways that civil rights law has led to in-
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such reforms rely on judicial oversight as a motivational mechanism for ensuring the effectiveness of private institutional reform (for example, by making legal liability contingent on the
implementation of an “effective” process of internal problem
solving for discrimination-related issues), they are likely to face
precisely the same obstacles that direct doctrinal reform has
encountered. As Samuel Bagenstos has persuasively argued,
“[j]udges who are committed to an individualized, fault-based
understanding of employment discrimination law” are unlikely
to enforce robust requirements for private institutional reform,
whether they are the primary implementers of such reforms or
simply (as the private institutional scholars propose) the
200
watchdogs of failures of compliance. There is little reason to
believe that a simple change of focus (from direct judicial enforcement to judicial monitoring of private enforcement) will
expand judicial conceptions of discrimination or the concomitant narrowness of focus that currently prevails in judicial approaches to discrimination litigation.
Absent the “stick” of effective judicial monitoring, proposals for private institutional reform must rely on private employers themselves (and/or institutional intermediaries such as
HR consultants) to be the guardians of effective reform. But,
there are profound reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of relying on employers and HR consultants as a means of promoting true change. If, as psychology scholars have documented,
most people do not see discrimination in all but the most egregious circumstances, how can we expect even good-faith private
institutional actors to meaningfully detect the problems they
201
are trying to correct? And, while reforms can be adopted even
in the absence of a full understanding of contemporary discrimination (and indeed are often justified today in terms which are
substantially or entirely divorced from a recognition of ongoing

stitutionalization of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action
practices by employers, but noting that the institutionalization of such practices may not lead to real results). See generally infra note 205 (regarding the
mixed success of institutionalized equal employment opportunity practices in
reducing discrimination and improving employment rates for protected
groups).
200. Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 44.
201. Cf. Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 33–34 (finding
that even in confidential after-the-fact interviews, defendants in discrimination lawsuits consistently maintained that they had not discriminated).
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202

discrimination), how effective can such policies—decoupled
from an understanding of their purpose—be?
Sociological research confirms the intuition that there are
reasons to be deeply concerned about advocating primary reliance on employer-driven institutional reforms, particularly insofar as those reforms have been decoupled from robust perceptions of continuing discriminatory practices. At this juncture, a
wide range of diversity reforms (ranging from diversity training
to affirmative action to work/family balance measures) have
been voluntarily adopted by American workplaces, affording
the opportunity to study both the mechanics of adoption and
203
the outcomes of such measures. What such research suggests
is that, first, most firms adopt reforms not for their actual efficacy in reducing discrimination (or in response to perceived discrimination), but for their perceived value in increasing stabil204
ity and limiting legal liability, and second, that many existing

202. See, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 158–59,
231–32 (2009) (documenting that many equal opportunity policies have been
justified and adopted by businesses for reasons unrelated to an actual desire
to remediate ongoing discrimination); see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589,
1589–91, 1620–21, 1626 (2001) (discussing the rise of diversity rhetoric as a
justification for internal employer reforms, and documenting the self-conscious
divorcing of such rhetoric from the need to remediate or address discrimination).
203. See, e.g., Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71
AM. SOC. REV. 589, 599 fig.2 (2006) (tracking the adoption of various forms of
diversity programs by medium and large employers over time). Strikingly, despite the existence of widespread EEO-related reforms—and extensive research regarding their adoption by organizations—there have been until recently very few systematic studies of the efficacy of such reforms. Id. at 590;
see also DOBBIN, supra note 202, at 21 (“One of the most surprising things
about the compliance regimes that corporations popularized is that they remain largely untested.”). The study by Kalev and her colleagues is one of the
most systematic attempts to date to investigate the actual influence of such
policies on outcomes, although there are also others. See infra note 205.
204. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 202, at 223; Frank Dobbin & Erin L.
Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1204, 1234 – 37 (2007); Kalev et
al., supra note 203, at 610. The same may not be true of the HR professionals
and consultants who are the primary advocates of such internal policies (although typically not the decision-makers on whether the policies are adopted).
It appears that there may be a sincere commitment on the part of many such
professionals to the principle of equal opportunity. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra
note 202, at 158–59. But cf. Edelman et al., supra note 202 (describing the rise
of “diversity” rhetoric in the professional management literature, and the extent to which it was often characterized in contradistinction to, and as superi-
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reforms are at best modestly effective and may even be coun205
terproductive in achieving anti-discrimination outcomes. For
example, recent research has shown that businesses’ adoption
of the most common form of diversity training is followed by a
substantial decrease—of approximately 10%—in minority and
206
female representation in management. Moreover, it appears

or to, more traditional EEO-based or affirmative action-based approaches).
Nevertheless, even in this context, there appear to have been very limited efforts to ascertain and act on the actual efficacy of reforms. See infra note 207
and accompanying text.
205. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
959, 972–76 (1999); Meg A. Bond & Jean L. Pyle, Diversity Dilemmas at Work,
7 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 252, 262 (1998); Frank Dobbin, et al., You Can’t Always
Get What You Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76
AM. SOC. REV. 386, 406 (2011); Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 605 tbl.3; see
also Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family,
3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 408 (2007) (describing how organizational
work/family policies may have limited effectiveness in practice); Joanna L.
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 41 & n.225
(2003) (“Since surveys began to track levels of harassment more than twenty
years ago, the number of employers enacting and disseminating antiharassment policies has grown exponentially while the underlying level of
harassment has gone unchanged.”); Madeline E. Heilman et al., The Affirmative Action Stigma of Incompetence: Effects of Performance Information Ambiguity, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 603 passim (1997) (showing that, in the experimental context, affirmative action beneficiaries were perceived as less
competent and recommended for lower salary increases); Erin L. Kelly et al.,
Getting There From Here: Research on the Effects of Work-Family Initiatives
on Work-Family Conflict and Business Outcomes, 2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 305
passim (2008) (showing mixed results of compiled studies regarding the effectiveness of work-family initiatives, including some studies that have found
negative correlations between such policies and positive outcome measures);
Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 228–35 (2004) (discussing
mixed results of research studying the effectiveness of anti-harassment policies); cf. Lauren Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 508–19
(1993) ( performing qualitative analysis of the handling of civil rights complaints by internal corporate complaint handlers, and showing that such complaints were typically recast in non-EEO terms (e.g., as simple personality
conflicts or poor management) and dealt with through measures designed to
diffuse tension as opposed to measures aimed at effectively remediating or
preventing future discrimination); Lauren Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC.
406, 448–49 (1999) (noting that when the courts “adopt forms of compliance
created within organizational fields, they run the risk of institutionalizing the
very forms of discrimination that laws were originally designed to alleviate”).
206. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Most Diversity Training Ineffective,

1338

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1275

that employers are unlikely to abandon or modify existing programs in response to ineffectiveness, even where those programs are affirmatively counter-productive from the perspec207
tive of anti-discrimination outcomes.
Of course, all this does not mean that voluntary reforms
are universally ineffective or have no role to play in promoting
equality. To the contrary, existing research makes clear that
some private institutional reforms—most notably those geared
towards creating clear lines of responsibility and clear
measures for success—do have significant effects on the actual
208
representation of women and minority workers. And, as to
numerous other reforms—such as those aimed at promoting
work/life balance—the verdict remains out, with some studies
suggesting efficacy and others suggesting little, or counter209
productive, effects. Thus, further pursuit of institutional reforms may well be worthwhile, insofar as such reforms are tailored to the developing findings regarding what programs are
actually effective in achieving anti-discrimination goals. Nevertheless, existing research suggests that, like doctrinal reform,
such reforms are unlikely to provide a panacea for preventing
or remedying discrimination, and indeed suggests the need to
proceed with caution in promoting further efforts at voluntary
reform.
A final possible solution to the problems of contemporary

Study Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2008, at A3 (describing the results of a follow-up study conducted by Alexandra Kalev that is not yet in publication).
207. See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 599 fig.2, 605 tbl.3 (documenting that diversity training—whose only statistically significant impact is
a reduction in representation of certain minority groups—has been by far the
fastest growing category of diversity programming during the most recent
decade studied). See generally supra note 203 (noting that minimal efforts
have been made to study the efficacy of equal opportunity programs, despite
their widespread adoption by American companies).
208. See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 602–04 (reporting research
results showing that “[t]he most effective practices are those that establish organizational responsibility: affirmative action plans, diversity staff, and diversity task forces”).
209. See, e.g., Albiston, supra note 205, at 407–09 (describing research on
the efficacy and limitations of work/family policies); Grossman, supra note
205, at 41–49 (describing mixed research regarding the efficacy of antiharassment policies and practices); Kelly et al., supra note 205 ( providing a
broad overview of work-family initiatives scholarship, and discussing the
mixed results that such scholarship has found regarding effectiveness); Lawton, supra note 205, at 228–35 (discussing mixed results of research studying
the effectiveness of anti-harassment policies).
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discrimination law that has sometimes—albeit much less frequently—been discussed by legal scholars is the possibility of
modifying judge and juror attitudes towards discrimination
cases by pursuing social change through public education or
210
other means. In theory, this type of social change work is an
obvious (and perhaps the most obvious) response to the findings of psychologists detailed in Part II. If people’s background
views about issues such as meritocracy, the incidence of discrimination, and discriminatory prototypes can be changed, existing psychological research provides every reason to believe
that many of the limitations of contemporary discrimination
law could be erased. And, there is evidence that at least some of
these views are mutable over time, suggesting their susceptibil211
ity to external influence.
However, existing evidence also suggests that to the extent
there have been shifts in these discrimination-related views,
they have been towards viewpoints that are increasingly unfavorable for discrimination litigants (for example, perceptions of
discrimination as rare have become increasingly common over
212
Moreover, existing psychological research provides
time).

210. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1521–28
(2005) (“Consequently, it is crystal clear that the first step in any campaign to
eliminate racial castes in education must be consciousness raising and ‘cognitive liberation’ about the validity of the tests themselves.”); Travis, supra note
191, at 377–78 (addressing strategies to address ADA backlash); see also Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 418–20 (2007) (arguing for the importance
of social change as a mechanism for reducing implicit biases).
211. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 186–91 (showing shifting views about racial discrimination and equality of opportunity in the
1970s); see also Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll, Q#34 (2011),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postkaiserpoll_
110211.html ( last visited March 27, 2012) (showing a 7% increase in the proportion of respondents reporting that racism is not a problem in our society
between 1995 and 2011).
212. See KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 186–91; Washington PostKaiser Family Foundation poll, supra note 211, at Q#34. This conclusion is
also supported by the shift in the perspective of the federal judiciary, which
originally developed a number of the fundamental doctrinal tests governing
Title VII based on the assumption that discrimination was a relatively likely
explanation for the disparate treatment of African Americans. See, e.g., Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating that the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume that these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of [discriminatory] factors” (quota-
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substantial reasons to suspect that, in the long term, meritocracy beliefs (e.g., the belief that everyone can get ahead in life)
may be the lynchpin of the difficulties faced by antidiscrimination litigants—and that this set of beliefs, in particu213
lar, is likely to resist efforts at change. Finally, the experience of civil rights organizations in continuing to attempt to
promote this type of change throughout the last several decades
is not encouraging. Despite ongoing efforts to publicize continuing egregious incidents of discrimination, and to institutionalize broader understandings of discrimination, the public continues to adhere strongly to the view that discrimination is a
rare, explicit, and narrow phenomenon and that America is
214
fundamentally a meritocracy. Thus, while continuing efforts
at social change are obviously critically important to ongoing
efforts to remedy the difficulties of discrimination law, the
215
mechanisms for effectuating such change are far from clear.
Thus, taking seriously a psychological account, none of the
principal existing academic reform proposals seems likely to result in a radical reconfiguration of the current difficulties that
tion omitted)).
213. See, e.g., Lipkus & Siegler, supra note 108, at 470 (“[M]eritocracy beliefs may have a causal influence on conceptions of racism.”); O’Brien et al.,
supra note 104, at 437–39 (showing that meritocracy beliefs are a significant
predictor of the adoption of narrow individualistic understandings of discrimination, and that such narrow individualistic understandings of discrimination
are associated with decreased perceptions of the incidence of discrimination in
specific circumstances); see also Jost & Hunyady, supra note 101, at 260–64
(describing the psychological antecedents and benefits of adopting meritocracy
beliefs, and suggesting that such beliefs are widespread because they fill a
common need to justify the status quo). See generally supra notes 98–100 and
accompanying text (describing the overwhelming prevalence of meritocracy
beliefs in American society).
214. See supra notes 98–100, 147–48 and accompanying text.
215. Of course, even in today’s society, ascription to the view that discrimination is a rare, narrow phenomenon varies to some extent across groups. See
supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. Thus, one possible reform that
might avoid the need for broad-based social change would be the increased appointment of individuals who are from groups more likely to subscribe to discrimination-litigant friendly views to the bench (this might include, for example, the appointment of minority and women judges, but also the appointment
of more plaintiff-side litigators and progressive scholars). Several studies have
shown that such judges are in fact more likely to rule in favor of discrimination litigants. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; cf. Scott A. Moss,
Judicial Hostility to Litigation and How it Impairs Legal Accountability for
Corporations and Other Defendants, 4 ADVANCE 5, 20–22 (2010) (arguing that
the uniformity of the Justices’ backgrounds on the Supreme Court has led to
an anti-litigation outlook that pervades the Court’s contemporary case law).
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putative victims of discrimination face. As a result, it is important to explore other alternative measures that may provide
an alternate means of redress, and that may be less likely to
implicate restrictive American background beliefs. In the following Section, I turn to a discussion of one such alternative,
i.e., extra-discrimination remedies.
B. THE ALTERNATIVE OF EXTRA-DISCRIMINATION REMEDIES
Extra-discrimination remedies (EDRs), as I use the term,
are remedies that in some way address questions of discrimination (or that allow a putative victim of discrimination to challenge a discriminatory job action), but that do not ask the liability question of “discrimination.” (For example, just-cause
claims, which allow employees to challenge unfair firings of any
kind, and Family and Medical Leave Act claims, which allow
employees to challenge family or medical leave-related terminations, are both examples of what I refer to as EDRs). While
EDRs do not feature prominently in the existing anti216
discrimination literature, they are in fact hardly a novel innovation in the real world of anti-discrimination litigation.
Thus, for example, a disabled employee who is terminated after
taking medical leave will often file a single lawsuit, alleging
that her termination was both discriminatory (on the basis of
disability) and a violation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act’s protected leave provisions. Similarly, in states whose
statutes or common law permit a “just cause” cause of action,
minority employees often claim that their firing was both discriminatory and made without just cause. As a result, my discussion here relates to the possibility of increased use of existing EDRs, as well as legislative advocacy for more widely
available EDRs, rather than an entirely new approach to conceptualizing and litigating discrimination claims.
As set forth below, there are ample reasons for believing
that this approach—i.e., increased use of and legislative advocacy for EDRs—may reap significant benefits for putative victims of discrimination. Indeed, taking seriously the findings of
psychology scholars, it seems likely that EDRs will be uniquely
216. I do not mean to suggest that I am alone in discussing this possibility,
although many of the prior works have focused on a specific EDR as an alternative or supplement to discrimination claims, as opposed to a more general
turn towards these types of remedies. For some of the prior works that have
addressed EDRs in the context of anti-discrimination law, see supra note 179.
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situated to avoid many of the obstacles to litigant success that
are posed by the restrictive and widely shared public views regarding discrimination. Of course, as with any proposed approach, there are also likely to be some drawbacks to increased
focus on EDRs. Below, I briefly elaborate on the definition of
EDRs (as it is used herein), followed by a more extended discussion of the general benefits and drawbacks of increased use
of EDR approaches.
1. Defining Extra-Discrimination Remedies
It is helpful to begin by adopting a tailored definition of extra-discrimination remedies (EDRs). After all, construed literally, EDRs can include virtually any approach to remedying problems of group-based inequality that are not founded in
discrimination claims. Thus, for example, policy-based antipoverty initiatives, just-cause legislation, and antistandardized testing initiatives can all be considered forms of
EDRs. Using the term in this broad sense, however, runs the
risk of analytical incoherence and vastly exceeds the scope of
what it is possible to address in the context of a single Article.
Thus, my focus herein is on the potential advantages (and
drawbacks) of one specific type of EDR—those EDRs that provide a litigation-based remedy.
So what types of litigation-based remedies might qualify as
EDRs? Drawing on existing statutory and common law tem217
plates, such remedies might include:
 “Just cause” remedies—In those states that have justcause legislation (or a similar common law cause of action), employers cannot terminate an employee without
just cause (e.g., employee misconduct or performance is218
sues). Just-cause claims—where they are available—

217. I should note that while my focus is on existing litigation-based EDRs
( litigation-based EDRs which have already been adopted or are being considered for adoption in one or more jurisdictions in the United States), in many
cases such EDRs would need to be legislatively adopted in a more significant
number of jurisdictions in order to be of substantial use to discrimination litigants. See infra Part IV.D.
218. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-901 et seq. (2011). While “just cause” legislation would provide the
most significant protections for employees who experience unwarranted terminations, many states have developed more limited common law protections
through expanded tort or contract-based remedies. For an overview of the
types of common law protections that have been developed in various states,
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provide an obvious alternative (or adjunct) to discriminatory termination claims, as discrimination victims virtually always contend that the reasons for their firing were
not justified. Moreover, termination claims comprise almost two-thirds of contemporary discrimination claims,
and thus just-cause claims (if broadly available) would
cover a substantial proportion of the claims being
219
brought by putative victims of discrimination.
 Family and Medical Leave Act-type statutes—The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and similar state statutes provide for legally protected paid or unpaid leave
and benefits for those with caretaking responsibilities,
pregnant women, and/or people with serious medical
220
conditions. These types of statutes help solve the problem of structural barriers to employment for women and
people with disabilities by creating entitlements to a cer221
tain amount of “full time/face time” flexibility and paid
or unpaid leave (both of which are often required to a
greater extent by women and people with disabilities).
As a result, FMLA-type remedies can serve as an adjunct
(or alternative) claim in an array of situations involving
the impact of structural discrimination on women and
people with disabilities.
 Healthy workplace laws—Healthy workplace laws make
employers responsible for all on-the-job harassment, irrespective of the discriminatory motivation of the har222
assers. As reflected in current EEOC filings, harass-

see Benjamin B. Dunford & Dennis J. Devine, Employment At-Will and Employee Discharge: A Justice Perspective on Legal Action Following Termination, 51 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 903, 907–16 (1998).
219. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015
(1991).
220. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. (2006); see also Federal vs. State Medical Leave Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/fmla/index.htm ( last visited May 10, 2012)
( providing links to the twelve jurisdictions with state-level FMLA laws).
221. I borrow this term from Michelle Travis, who has properly noted that
the presumed “full time/face time” norm has a significant adverse impact on
women and people with disabilities. See Travis, supra note 180.
222. Professor David Yamada has written extensively on this issue and has
drafted a model law that is currently under consideration in a number of
states. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and
the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J.
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ment is one of the predominant complaints raised by putative victims of discrimination, comprising a component
223
of roughly one-third of all discrimination charges.
Thus, healthy workplace laws could provide a significant
adjunct or alternative to discrimination-based harassment claims.
 School-based anti-bullying legislation—School-based anti-bullying legislation, like healthy workplace laws,
makes institutions responsible for student-on-student or
teacher-on-student harassment, often without regard to
whether the harassment was motivated by discrimina224
tion. Like healthy workplace laws, anti-bullying statutes can provide an alternative (or adjunct) to existing
discrimination-based claims, where the plaintiff has been
subjected to harassment based on their protected class
status.
 Common law claims—A wide array of common law
claims, from intentional infliction of emotional distress
to wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, can be
475 passim (2000) (discussing the problem, analyzing existing legal theories,
and proposing a legislative solution); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying
and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment,
32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 passim (2010) [hereinafter Yamada, Workplace Bullying] (describing the prior ten years of progress regarding workplace
bullying and providing and analyzing model legislation, “The Healthy Workplace Bill,” aimed at combating workplace bullying). While no state has yet
enacted these types of laws, they have been introduced in a number of states
and are under active consideration in New York as well as other locales. See
Mike Schlicht & Tom Witt, Bipartisan Consensus at Last, ITHICA J., June 1,
2010 (Viewpoints), available at 2010 WLNR 11069671; Yamada, Workplace
Bullying, supra, at 252.
223. Compare Charge Statistics: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm ( last visited May 10, 2012)
(99,947 total charges in FY 2011), with Harassment Charges, EEOC & FEPAs
Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/harassment.cfm ( last visited May 10, 2012) (30,512 harassment
charges in FY 2011).
224. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(A)(X) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-222d (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 et seq. (West Supp.
2011); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-20.14 et seq. (2006); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 17:416.13 et seq. (Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F et seq. (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-13–18 (West 2010); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2801-a (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 §§ 24 -100.2–100.5 (West
2005 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 339.351–364 (West Supp. 2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-24 (West 2011)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 565
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2011); W.VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18-2C et seq. (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011).
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used to hold individual wrong-doers (and sometimes
their employers) responsible for wrongful conduct target225
ing a putative victim of discrimination. Discrimination
victims already fairly commonly include such claims in
litigation, where they are available under the specific ju226
risprudence of the jurisdiction in which the case arose.
 Retaliation claims—Retaliation claims can be brought
under all of the major discrimination laws if an employer
has taken action against an employee for complaining
about discrimination or otherwise pursing discrimination
227
claims. Retaliation claims can be characterized as a
hybrid EDR/discrimination claim, insofar as they are
predicated on the employee’s opposition to what they
perceived as discrimination, but do not require a judge or
jury to find that the individual was actually discriminat228
ed against. As is illustrated by EEOC charge statistics,
retaliation claims already serve as a frequent adjunct to
discrimination claims, with roughly one-third of all
229
charges raising a retaliation claim.
Thus, litigation-based EDRs can take a diversity of forms
in addressing contemporary problems of group-based inequality—forms that will vary depending on context and on the group
inequality to be addressed. Through this diversity of forms,

225. See sources cited infra note 226; see also Dunford & Devine, supra
note 218 (describing the array of approaches that states have taken to justcause common law claims).
226. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered
Employees, in REPRESENTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDERED
CLIENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 81, 99–102 (2009) (discussing the ways that common law claims have been utilized to protect the rights of LGBT victims of
harassment and discrimination); Julie Gannon Shoop, Common Law Claims
Gain Favor in Job Discrimination Cases, TRIAL, Feb. 1996, at 75, 75–76 (describing litigants opting to pursue state common law claims rather than Title
VII claims in federal court); Jason E. Pirruccello, Note, Contingent Worker
Protection From Client Company Discrimination: Statutory Coverage, Gaps,
and the Role of the Common Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191, 194, 206–222 (2005)
(describing an array of common law claims that could provide a cause of action
for independent contractors who experience on-the-job discrimination or harassment).
227. See Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm
( last visited May 10, 2012).
228. Under existing retaliation doctrine, an employee does not have to
prove that he or she was actually discriminated against in order to prevail. Id.
229. See Charge Statistics: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm ( last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
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EDRs could potentially be used by many putative victims of
discrimination as an alternative or adjunct to discrimination
claims, allowing them to raise claims that do not involve fram230
ing the issue as one of “discrimination.”
2. Potential Benefits of Extra-Discrimination Remedies
So what are the potential benefits of EDRs from the perspective of a putative victim of discrimination? Most obviously,
such approaches obviate the need for a judge or jury to make a
determination that a particular set of facts is (or could be) discrimination. Because the operative issue under EDRs is not
whether a particular individual has been discriminated
against—but rather whether the set of facts presented can fulfill a distinct (and typically more straightforward) set of statutory or judicial requirements—the difficult and psychologically
contingent question of whether discrimination truly took place
need not be resolved.
The findings of psychology scholars suggest that this distinction is likely to make a substantial difference in the adjudication of the claims of putative victims of discrimination. Thus,
for example, existing mental prototypes or templates—a factor
that has been documented to significantly diminish most people’s willingness to make attributions to discrimination—are
231
likely to instead be helpful to many EDR litigants. For exam-

230. Of course, litigation-based EDRs will not always be available as an
alternative (or adjunct) to discrimination claims. For example, to the extent
that scholars have decried the lack of a strong disparate impact doctrine in
contemporary anti-discrimination law, this problem is unlikely to be fully resolved by litigation-based EDRs (although it may certainly be partially addressed through piecemeal approaches, as evidenced by the success of FMLAstyle laws). See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. It may be that policy-based approaches or broad-based social change will be necessary to effectuate the types of sweeping changes in the disparate impact area that advocates and scholars would like to see occur. Similarly, EDRs are unlikely to be
able to provide a meaningful alternative for those few discrimination cases
that are based on class or collective claims. Cf. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 189 (showing that class and collective claims comprise a
very small proportion of all discrimination claims litigated, and that such
claims are among the most successful discrimination claims (and thus may not
require supplementation through EDRs)). Nevertheless, litigation-based EDRs
are likely to be a possibility in many of the areas in which discrimination litigants currently bring individualized claims.
231. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. Obviously, different
prototypes may be activated by different EDRs, and thus the influence of this
factor will not be monolithic. However, it appears that for some of the major
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ple, as the work of Pauline Kim and others has shown, most
employees have expansive beliefs about non-just-cause terminations, believing that a wide array of factually unjustified firings are unfair and unlawful, despite the fact that at-will em232
ployment remains the norm in most states. Similarly, many
individuals have expansive views of what constitutes retaliatory behavior—views that tend to be far more expansive than
corresponding views regarding what constitutes discrimina233
tion. Thus, the prototypes that judges and jurors have in relation to many EDRs are likely to be much more plaintifffavorable than commonly held discrimination prototypes. Insofar as the work of psychology scholars suggests that such prototypes influence outcomes, EDRs are thus likely to be better sit234
uated than discrimination claims to prevail.
For similar reasons, preexisting beliefs about the commonality or rarity of a particular type of illegal or illicit behavior—
beliefs that, as described above, typically decrease willingness
to make attributions to discrimination—are unlikely to have a
235
comparable effect on the adjudication of many EDRs. Thus,

EDRs, including “just cause” litigation, this factor may help—rather than
hurt—claimants.
232. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 passim.
233. Certainly, the spate of recent Supreme Court decisions broadly construing retaliation law (during a time frame when the Court has been less
than expansive in its construction of discrimination law generally), are suggestive that the Court itself has a broader understanding of retaliatory behavior than its accompanying views of discrimination. See, e.g., Thompson v. N.
Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867–70 (2011) (holding that terminating an employee’s fiancé in retaliation for conduct protected under Title VII violates Title VII’s retaliation provision, and that fiancé was a “person aggrieved” entitled to sue under Title VII); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–80 (2009) (holding that an employee who participated
in an employer-initiated discrimination investigation was protected against
retaliation under Title VII); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (construing Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision as providing broader coverage than its anti-discrimination provision, and holding that
retaliation provision encompasses all “materially adverse” retaliatory actions,
even where they do not affect the terms or conditions of employment).
234. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 144 –46 and accompanying text. Again, this factor—
namely, individuals’ preexisting beliefs about the commonality or rarity of a
particular type of illegal behavior—will not have a monolithic impact, but instead will vary depending on the EDR that is relied upon. However, there is
again data that suggests that many significant EDRs may be better situated
than discrimination claims vis-à-vis this issue.
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while it is well-documented that the general public tends to believe that discrimination is rare (and that this view tends to decrease attributions to discrimination in individual cases), a
very significant proportion of the American public has personally experienced a termination or layoff that they believe was un236
fair (i.e., not for just cause or due to company fault). Similarly, illegal or unethical corporate behavior, as a general matter,
is perceived as relatively common by the American public, a
finding that is perhaps unsurprising in the milieu of Enron and
237
Bernie Madoff. Thus, unlike discrimination—which is widely
thought of as rare today—the illegal or illicit behaviors addressed by many EDRs are thought of as common. As a result,
this factor is likely to actually benefit many EDR plaintiffs, or at
a minimum, not stand as a hindrance to EDR plaintiffs’ success.
Finally, existing psychological research suggests that meritocracy beliefs—perhaps the lynchpin of most individuals’ unwillingness to make attributions to discrimination—simply are
not challenged by attributions to unfairness or other types of
impropriety in the same way they are by allegations of discrimination. Psychology scholars have documented that claims of

236. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from Employee to
Complainant: Situational and Psychological Determinants of WrongfulTermination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 568, 571 (2000) (in survey of unemployed adults, 34% believed that their employer was at fault in the termination, and mean response by study respondents indicated a general perception that terminations were unfair); see also JESSICA GODOFSKY ET AL., JOHN
J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE DEV., RUTGERS UNIV., WORK TRENDS:
AMERICAN WORKERS ASSESS AN ECONOMIC DISASTER 9 (2010), available at
http://http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/Work_Trends
_September_2010.pdf (finding that the majority of Americans believe the unemployed are out of work due to no fault of their own); Rich Morin, Most ‘Reemployed’ Workers Say They’re Overqualified for Their New Job, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1718/re-employedworkers-recession-satisfaction-job-qualification (reporting data showing that many
workers have experienced a job loss in recent years).
237. See Questions and Answers About Enron: How is the American Public
Reacting to the Enron Crisis?, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www
.gallup.com/poll/5332/questions-answers-about-enron.aspx (reporting poll responses showing that 75% of respondents believed that the types of activities
that were engaged in by Enron also exist at “some” or “most” other large corporations; also showing that only 16% rated the honesty and ethics of business
executives as “high” or “very high”); see also Ethics Impact Employment and
Productivity, MGMT. WORLD (Jan./Feb. 2009), http://cob.jmu.edu/icpm/
management_world/AllJan09.pdf (one in four survey respondents indicated
that within the past six months they had witnessed unethical or illegal behavior in their own workplaces).

2012]

LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

1349

discrimination trigger uniquely hostile responses from observers and that claims of generic unfairness (or other attributions
that are not localized in discrimination) attract far less hostili238
ty. For example, while individuals who make attributions to
discrimination are often stereotyped as difficult, unpleasant,
and undesirable to work with, people who make attributions to
other causes (including simple unfairness or the difficulty of
239
the task) are evaluated significantly more favorably. This
phenomenon, moreover, appears to be directly linked to meritocracy beliefs, with the level of hostility expressed towards
those who make attributions to discrimination—but not other
causes—varying considerably based on the strength of the observer’s meritocracy beliefs (and/or based on whether the ob240
server has been primed with meritocracy beliefs).

238. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 47–50
(summarizing the results of prior studies, which had found that those who attribute a lack of success to discrimination are derogated much more significantly by research subjects than those who attribute to other causes); Kaiser
& Miller, Stop Complaining, supra note 118, at 258, 261 (demonstrating that
subjects rated an African American as more hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, troublemaking and complaining when he attributed his
failure to discrimination, even where there was significant evidence of discrimination; also showing that attribution to other external causes (such as difficulty of the test) did not result in increased derogation as compared to internal
causes (such as answer quality)); see also Shelton & Stewart, supra note 97, at
220–21 (showing a statistically significant correlation between confronting
discrimination and being perceived as a “complainer,” and an inverse correlation between discrimination confrontation and being perceived as a “good person,” but finding no statistically significant trends in perception of confronters
where women confronted “offensive” but nondiscriminatory comments). But cf.
Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury
Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2003) (reporting findings that
jurors are, as a general matter, suspicious of plaintiffs of all kinds because of a
perception that the fact of bringing a lawsuit is counter to the ethic of individual responsibility).
239. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97 at 47–50;
Kaiser & Miller, Stop Complaining, supra note 118, at 258, 261; see also Shelton & Stewart, supra note 97, at 220–21 (finding similar results when individuals confront discriminatory comments).
240. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54 –57
(summarizing results of a number of studies showing that meritocracy beliefs
moderate psychological threat responses to attributions of discrimination, but
do not have a comparable effect in the context of attributions to other causes);
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at
1527, 1531 (reporting experimental results showing that meritocracy beliefs
moderate the extent of derogation directed at individuals who make attributions to discrimination but do not moderate the extent of derogation directed at
individuals who make attributions to other causes, including simple unfairness).
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The reason for this disparity in responses appears to be
relatively straightforward—while claims of discrimination raise
the specter of systematic deviations from meritocratic norms
and thus trigger defensive responses, as discussed in Part II—
claims of simple unfairness or violation of technical legal norms
241
do not. In essence, illegal discrimination is perceived to be
part of a wider societal phenomenon (group-based bias against
particular groups), whereas other forms of unfairness or illegality (including arbitrary—but nondiscriminatory—employer actions) are perceived as non-systematic and thus unthreatening
242
to the global prevalence of meritocracy. As a result, attributions to unfairness or violations of technical legal norms do not
trigger the types of psychological responses (such as rationalization, victim blame, and denial) that are triggered in the con243
text of attributions to discrimination.
Thus, all three of the factors that psychology scholars have
identified as playing a role in the reluctance of most individuals
244
to make attributions to discrimination are unlikely to have a
245
comparable effect in the context of EDRs. Moreover, one additional feature of EDRs—their tendency to impose more concrete
standards for adjudication than discrimination claims—is likely to further improve EDRs’ success rates vis-à-vis discrimina246
tion claims. Indeed, psychology scholars have shown that

241. See, e.g., Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly,
supra note 106, at 1528 (theorizing that discrimination attributions are likely
to be particularly threatening to meritocracy beliefs because of their global
implications).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text; see also Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54 –55 (discussing studies that have
found that high endorsers of meritocracy beliefs as well as those primed with
meritocracy beliefs, experience heightened psychological distress (feeling anxious, nervous, distressed) when witnessing an attribution to discrimination).
244. See supra Part II (describing in detail the factors that psychology
scholars have identified as playing a role in the reluctance of most individuals
to make attributions to discrimination).
245. Cf. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79
OR. L. REV. 391, 398–404 (2000) (in the criminal law context, arguing that policies that harness existing norms rather than relying on a pure deterrence
model are more likely to succeed).
246. For example, one type of FMLA claim (albeit not the only type) looks
simply at whether the employer has complied with legally specified leave and
reinstatement requirements in order to determine liability. For a description
of the FMLA and its requirements, see Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ ( last visited May 10, 2012). Simi-
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well-defined and non-ambiguous constraints on decision-making
(often referred to as “strong situations”) can be significantly
more effective at constraining psychological biases (and other individualized factors) than the type of weak constraints found in
247
discrimination laws. Thus, even if judges and jurors do have
biases regarding EDR claims, the presence of strong constraints
248
may make the effectuation of those biases less likely.
larly, many just-cause regimes impose liability based on an employer’s failure
to comply with its own written termination procedures, an inquiry that will
often ( but not always) involve the application of a more concrete set of constraints. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-904 (2011) (defining a discharge as wrongful where “the employer
violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.”).
247. See, e.g., William H. Cooper & Michael J. Withey, The Strong Situation Hypothesis, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 62, 62–64, 70 (2009)
(describing the hypothesis, noting that it is widespread, but cautioning that
existing research does not currently provide adequate empirical support to
confirm the hypothesis); Kahan, supra note 193, at 774 –75, 796 (finding that
very clear explicit legal standards do have some impact on outcomes, even
where jurors have strong underlying background views); Rustin D. Meyer et
al., A Review and Synthesis of Situational Strength in the Organizational Sciences, 36 J. MGMT. 121, 133–34 (2010) ( providing a meta-analysis of the literature and finding some support for the strong situation hypothesis). Although it
appears that strong situations do restrain the impact of preexisting background views and biases, they are not entirely effective at eliminating the influences of underlying beliefs. For example, even in the presence of a very specific jury instruction apparently requiring conviction, Dan Kahan found that
more than one third of study participants continued to act in accordance with
their preexisting (and inconsistent) views regarding the meaning of “rape.” See
Kahan, supra, at 795–97.
248. One could also argue based on this literature that the antidiscrimination laws should be amended to provide more concrete constraints.
The most obvious such amendment would modify the law to provide for a “pretext only” regime, i.e., a regime in which the judge or juror is required to find
discrimination upon a determination that the reason the employer has given
for the termination was not the true reason. (This, of course, is an approach
which has been rejected by the Supreme Court, see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 –15 (1993), but Congress could adopt such an approach through legislative action.) Alternatively, a judge or juror could be required to make a finding of discrimination where the employer has made remarks that are indicative of group bias (although this is an approach that
even many progressives—including myself—might find discomforting). While
there is some theoretical appeal to these types of approaches, there are real
risks in attempting to force judges and jurors to classify a particular factual
circumstance as discrimination when their intuitive views are strongly divergent from that understanding. As an initial matter, while strong constraints
have been shown to have some effect on outcomes, there remain a substantial
number of decision-makers who will follow their preexisting beliefs. See, e.g.,
Kahan, supra note 193, at 774 –75, 796 (experimentally demonstrating this
phenomenon in the criminal law context). Moreover, crafting a legal discrimi-
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Initial empirical findings suggest that the foregoing advantages of EDRs are far from merely theoretical. As Kevin
Clermont and Stewart Schwab have documented, FMLA
claims—which provide structural remedies for inequality-based
problems without requiring findings of group-based discrimina249
tion—fare far better than discrimination claims. Thus, for
example, FMLA claimants win pretrial adjudications at roughly 4 times the rate of discrimination litigants, and prevail at
trial in roughly 60% of cases, as compared to the roughly 30–
250
35% trial victory rates of discrimination litigants. Indeed, the
overall “win” rate for FMLA litigants is close to double the win
rates for discrimination claimants (win rates that are strikingly
similar (and low) across all of the various discrimination stat251
utes, including Title VII, the ADA, § 1981 and the ADEA).
These results—a double or more success rate for FMLA claimnation regime that is increasingly divergent from public understandings of
discrimination seems likely to only increase the problem of doctrinal drift discussed in supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. Finally, forcing decisionmakers to apply a specific definition of discrimination that does not comport to
public understandings seems likely to only exacerbate the public perception of
discrimination litigation (and litigants) as predominantly frivolous. Thus, to
the extent that similar ends can be achieved without requiring the classification of the ultimate event as discrimination (for example, through just-cause
legislation, which imposes an even higher standard on employers than a “pretext only” regime), this approach seems preferable to trying to further define
“discrimination” under the law in ways that profoundly diverge from common
understandings. Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an
At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1996) (arguing that the presence of
discrimination protections, coupled with a lack of just-cause termination protections in most states, may funnel claims which are more properly characterized in just-cause terms into discrimination causes of action); Michael Selmi,
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 782 (2006)
(characterizing as one of two “critical mistakes” underlying disparate impact
the notion “that it was possible to redefine discrimination purely through legal
doctrine” and noting that the redefinition of discrimination in law has not led
to a similar redefinition in public opinion).
249. Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note
27, at 445.
250. See id. In the case of bench trials alone, the disparities are even more
striking, with 80% of FMLA claimants prevailing before judges as compared to
a 20–25% success rate for discrimination litigants. Id. In calculating figures
based on the data provided by Clermont and Schwab, I omitted § 1983 claims,
as it was unclear whether such claims were exclusively discrimination-related
or also included other forms of constitutional or statutory claims that can be
brought pursuant to § 1983.
251. As noted, supra note 30, the overall win rates for virtually all classes
of discrimination litigants are very similar and cluster around ten or eleven
percent. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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ants as compared to discrimination litigants—are striking and
suggest that there may in fact be substantial advantages to
252
EDRs.
Figure 3
Trial Win Rates: Discrimination Plaintiffs v. EDR Plaintiffs

While there is less extensive data on the success rates of
litigants bringing just-cause claims, existing studies strongly
suggest that the success rates of such litigants also substantial253
ly exceed the success rates of discrimination litigants. Thus,
252. The comparative success of FMLA claimants may explain why pregnancy and other family responsibilities discrimination claims have a much
higher success rate than other forms of discrimination claims. See, e.g., MARY
C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW,
LITIGATING THE MATERIAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 13–14 (2006), available at
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf (highlighting the high win rates in
family responsibilities discrimination cases when compared to win rates in
traditional employment discrimination cases). Since such claims can often be
brought under both the FMLA and Title VII, they typically will have a basis
both in EDRs and in discrimination law. I am unaware of any author that has
disaggregated family responsibilities discrimination by statutory basis of
claim to try to determine whether the increased incidence of success is an artifact of the prevalence of FMLA claims in that context.
253. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 147, at 516, 518, 520–22, 524 (describing prior studies of common law just-cause claims at trial, which had consistently found success rates in the 60–70% range); S. Richard Pincus, Final
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existing studies of trial victory rates (the primary area that has
been studied for just-cause claims) have repeatedly found that
plaintiffs prevail at trial on statutory or common law just-cause
254
claims at a rate of roughly 60–70%. This success rate is very
similar to the FMLA success rate found by Clermont and
255
Schwab, and vastly exceeds the trial success rates experienced by any class of discrimination litigants.
Finally, retaliation claims brought under the antidiscrimination laws—which have characteristics of both a discrimination claim and an EDR—appear to have success rates at
trial that are slightly lower than the success rates of FMLA and
just-cause litigants but that remain substantially higher than
256
the success rates of discrimination litigants. Thus, retaliation
claims—which do not ask the judge and jury to make an ultimate finding of discrimination, but which often rely to some extent on the reasonableness of an employee’s perception that
discrimination occurred—appear to fall somewhere between
true EDRs and discrimination claims in their level of success.

and Binding Arbitration: A Sensible Alternative to Expensive Employment Litigation, 22 J. HEALTH L. 343, 343 n.5 (1989) (citing to study reporting a 64%
success rate for wrongful discharge cases at trial); cf. supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing trial success rates for discrimination claimants,
which have generally been reported in the 30–35% range).
254. See Oppenheimer, supra note 147, at 516, 518, 520–22, 524; Pincus,
supra note 253, at 343 n.5.
255. See Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra
note 27, at 445.
256. There is relatively little data on how retaliation claims fare in court.
However, news reports suggest a trial victory rate of roughly 57%. Wendy Hyland, Equal Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse Employment
Action Standard to Allow Only Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 KY. L.J.
273, 277 n.19 (2001); see also Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA:
Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166,
191 n.132 (2000) (discussing an analysis performed for USA Today by Jury
Verdict Research showing that individuals who file retaliation lawsuits win
more cases than victims of “age, disability, race or sex discrimination”); Scott
A. Moss, Against “Academic Deference”: How Recent Developments in Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2006) (noting that retaliation claims are
the most successful type of employment discrimination claims). See generally
Erin E. Buzuvis, Sidelined: Title IX Retaliation Cases and Women’s Leadership in College Athletics, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 38–45 (2010) (arguing that the retaliation cause of action has operated to fill existing gaps in the
vitality of challenges to sex discrimination in the specific context of Title IX
and athletics).
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Of course, none of the data described above was collected
as part of an analysis designed to test the comparative efficacy
of EDRs and discrimination claims, much less as part of a
study designed to ascertain the causes of any disparity in success rates. Thus, they cannot answer the ultimate question of
whether EDRs are more effective than discrimination claims in
similar factual circumstances, or whether any comparative advantage of such claims results from the lesser salience of the
type of background beliefs that have been found to be associat257
ed with resistance to making attributions to discrimination.
Moreover, no existing analysis has addressed the issue of how
lawsuits involving concurrent EDR and discrimination claims
fare (whether, for example, a concurrent EDR claim raises the
likelihood of success on a discrimination claim, or conversely,
whether EDR claims fare worse when brought together with
discrimination claims). Thus, further research is necessary to
answer many substantial questions regarding the potential
utility of EDR claims. Nevertheless, existing data provides considerable reasons to believe that EDR claims are significantly
more likely to result in successful outcomes for litigants than
traditional discrimination causes of action.

257. For a discussion of the findings of psychology scholars regarding individuals’ resistance to making attributions to discrimination and the background beliefs that have been found to play a role in this phenomenon, see supra Part II.
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3. Possible Critiques of Extra-Discrimination Remedies

Even if EDRs are more effective than discrimination remedies, there may, of course, still be a number of critiques to placing increased focus on their use. Among the most compelling of
such critiques is the lost moral valence of moving away from
claims of discrimination towards an increased focus on claims
that are—by their very nature—designed to be less morally and
socially charged. Most individuals who are deeply invested in
the anti-discrimination enterprise—including scholars, advocates, and litigants—care about redressing discrimination precisely because it is discrimination. Whether some abstract
technical violation of the law has occurred often matters little
(if at all) to the emotional and moral salience of the alleged
wrongdoing.
The most compelling response to such arguments—at least
on an individual level—is that there are precious few moral victories for victims of discrimination in the current state of affairs. Certainly, for the significant number of litigants who lose
their cases outright (on motion practice or at trial, for example),
there is no moral justice. And, for those who settle, moral victo259
ries are often also in short supply. Indeed, few would contend
that receiving $30,000 in exchange for signing an agreement
that typically requires promises of secrecy, agreements not to
disparage the employer or voluntarily help other victims of discrimination, and that is larded with employer refutations that
258. For each of the individual EDRs mentioned here, there is an extensive
literature addressing its merits and drawbacks from an individualized perspective. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (making arguments in support of the employment at will); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability
of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996)
(discussing the relative merits of legally imposed workplace regulations as
compared to those that are based on informal norms, with particular attention
paid to just-cause regimes/norms); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad
for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010) (critiquing the American approach to reconciling
work-family conflict and suggesting that such an approach may be partially
responsible for the United States’ inadequate maternity leave policies). My
discussion herein does not extend to such critiques, but is limited to critiques
of the general concept of making increased use of EDRs as a means of improving the odds of success for putative victims of discrimination. Whether a specific EDR is advisable from perspectives other than the potential benefit to putative victims of discrimination is a complex question that would, of course,
need to be fully engaged before proceeding with specific legislative action.
259. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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any discrimination ever took place constitutes a moral victo260
ry. Even for those few clients that have won major trial victories—purportedly the ultimate form of moral vindication—the
seemingly never-ending cycle of post trial motions and appeals
blunts the moral force of victory, and dispels any notion that
the employer has truly “learned” anything. In short, there is little likelihood of moral gain for individual victims of discrimination, while there is much to lose in defeat.
While critiques of lost moral valence thus have little power
on an individual level, they are worth taking more seriously on
a global level. After all, the abandonment of a principal focus
on discrimination (in academia, in litigation, or in advocacy)
can only hasten the already sturdy perception of discrimination
as a rare and aberrant phenomenon that need not preoccupy
our attentions today. Such an outcome obviously disserves the
interests of discrimination victims, insofar as it would predictably lead to even further deterioration of support for efforts to
remediate discrimination (whether on a global or individual
scale). It would be ironic, to say the least, if efforts to better
serve putative victims of discrimination contributed to the demise of the most stalwart protector of such victims—
261
discrimination laws themselves.
As a result, it seems clear that some balance between the
remedies that will most effectively serve putative victims of
discrimination now and the strategies that will most effectively
enhance the public salience of discrimination in the long-term
262
is needed in pursuing discrimination reform. As we learn

260. Cf. Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 16, 33 (noting
that defendants, even post-settlement, consistently maintain that no discrimination took place and that their decision to settle was purely pragmatic).
261. Derrick Bell has made a similar point in calling for increased focus on
pursuing equality by “forging fortuity” outside of the confines of discrimination
doctrine, while noting that we neglect formal discrimination protections at our
peril. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 189–93 (2004).
262. I should be clear that there are certain circumstances in which this
balance will obviously weigh in favor of focusing energies on discrimination
approaches. Most notably, in circumstances where a group (such as lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender employees) has not yet achieved statutory antidiscrimination protections, it seems clear that the primary objective must be
to obtain such protections (although EDR claims may be helpful—and indeed
sometimes the only alternative—in obtaining redress for current victims of
discrimination). Put simply, without a statutory baseline rendering discrimination illegal, concerns about the scope of what people may perceive as dis-
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more about how EDRs operate—whether they are effective as
an adjunct (as opposed to a substitute) to discrimination claims
and what types of claims fare best comparatively under EDRtype approaches—we will be better able to assess when an
EDR-based approach seems most appropriate, and when discrimination claims (either as an adjunct or alone) remain the
best approach. Moreover, increased advocacy and publicity
around the enactment of EDRs should not detract from the continuing need to publicize compelling instances of discrimination
and to agitate for broader public understandings of discrimination’s harms. In short, there is little to lose, and potentially
much to gain, from pursuing both EDRs and more traditional
discrimination remedies.
The question then becomes whether this type of approach
is practically or politically feasible. After all, while EDRs are
already available in some jurisdictions in some forms, significantly increased reliance on EDRs would require the enactment
of legislation, which is hardly a trivial enterprise. There are,
moreover, numerous potential obstacles that one can envision
to successful efforts to promote such remedies, such as a lack of
collective focus of advocacy groups (incidental to the wide array
of potential remedies that such groups could seek to promote),
and a decreased willingness of constituents and granting agencies to fund non-group based legislative efforts by civil rights
advocacy groups.
This Article cannot hope to fully address the political complexities of enacting new EDR legislation. However, a few obcriminatory are hardly the most central of discrimination victims’ concerns.
See, e.g., KATIE R. EYER, PROTECTING LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER (LGBT ) WORKERS: STRATEGIES FOR BRINGING EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY IN THE ABSENCE OF
CLEAR STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 18 (2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/
sites/default/files/Eyer_on_Protecting_LGBT_Workers--FINAL_0.pdf (identifying a
“federal civil rights law prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination” as a goal “critical to creating genuine change in working conditions and
employment opportunities”); Katie R. Eyer, Have We Arrived Yet? LGBT Rights
and the Limits of Formal Equality, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 160, 164 (2010) (arguing that “an identity politics model is necessary in order for a legally disfavored group to make the transition to formal legal equality”). Among other
things, while discrimination law is by no means perfect in deterring real-world
discrimination, it does have some deterrence effects—effects that would be
completely lost absent formal anti-discrimination protections. See generally
supra note 199 (describing research relating to the role of formal antidiscrimination protections in improving economic outcomes for protected
groups).
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servations are worth making here. First, the problem of a diffuse focus that pursuing EDRs brings, while real, should be
surmountable by effective coalition building and the prioritization of the most broadly applicable of reforms. Thus, for example, just-cause legislation, whose benefits as an adjunct to discrimination claims would be available to all groups who seek to
bring discrimination claims, is an obvious place to begin and
would allow the building of broad coalitions around a single
movement for change. Such a movement would undoubtedly
have the advantage of being able to attract the support of others beyond the groups traditionally protected by discrimination
legislation, including workers’ advocacy groups and others
263
seeking a fairer and more predictable employment regime.
Indeed, existing social science research suggests that EDRs—
precisely because of their broad-based and inclusive nature—
may be among the most politically viable of legislative ap264
proaches to reform.
Moreover, to the extent that EDR-related efforts constitute
only a fraction of the work of civil rights advocacy groups, it
seems unlikely that they will materially affect the support for
those organizations. As set forth above, there are good reasons
for civil rights organizations to continue to engage in a diversity of approaches, including robust efforts to utilize and further
265
And indeed,
expand traditional discrimination remedies.
many civil rights organizations already engage in a diversity of
approaches, including EDR-based advocacy around issues that
are considered material to their constituents’ equality con-

263. Employers may even be included among those who would support these types of reforms, as employers may prefer the predictability of a fixed legal
regime to the uncertainty that accompanies the common law regimes that exist in many states.
264. See, e.g., Margaret Weir et al., The Future of Social Policy in the United States: Political Constraints and Possibilities, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 421, 42 1 –45 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988)
(describing the political difficulties faced by social welfare programs that are
associated only with poor or minority constituents and describing the enhanced political viability of very broad-based social welfare programs); cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–28(1980) (arguing that the result in Brown
v. Board of Education was made possible only a result of the convergence of
the interests of the white majority with the anti-segregation outcome of
Brown, and that commitment to enforcement waned again when those interests diverged).
265. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text.
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266

cerns. It thus seems profoundly unlikely that further diversifying advocacy efforts will materially harm the support for advocacy groups that promote civil rights concerns.
Finally, it is worth noting that the history of efforts to legislatively enact EDRs provides a basis for some hope regarding
such approaches’ political feasibility, although certainly not for
unqualified optimism. Many EDRs, including for example
267
FMLA-style laws, have been successfully enacted in the past.
Moreover, to the extent that efforts to enact such legislation
have failed, it has often been at least in part because of the
ambivalence or active resistance of groups (such as unions or
trial lawyers) that are natural allies, but have nevertheless
268
faced context-specific competing concerns. Thus, there are
reasons to believe that EDR-based legislation could achieve political success (albeit certainly not in all jurisdictions or at all
times) if backed by a broad-based and sustained coalition of civil rights groups and other progressive allies. At a bare minimum, EDR legislation seems as likely to be politically viable as
the primary alternative (i.e., significant amendments to the anti-discrimination laws) given the broader-based constituency
269
that EDRs would ultimately protect.
CONCLUSION
Few would dispute that civil rights litigants (and their advocates) have radically transformed the American social and
political landscape. Discrimination is today a term with tre-

266. See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
http://www.naacpldf.org ( last visited May 10, 2012) (detailing the array of racial justice work that the LDF is currently working on, including work that is
not focused on purely discrimination-based remedies).
267. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36
LAB. L.J. 557, 561–63 (1985) (noting that unions have typically not lobbied on
behalf of unjust discharge legislation, and that such legislation has been actively opposed by plaintiff-side trial lawyers in some of the states where it has
been proposed); see also Chris Bragg, ‘Poison Pill’ Measures Pulled From Ballot, COLO. STATESMAN (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.coloradostatesman.com/
content/%3Fpoison-pill%3F-measures-pulled-ballot (describing a deal between
Colorado labor and business leaders to remove certain pro-worker initiatives,
including an initiative that would have required “just cause” for terminations
in Colorado, from the November 2008 ballot, in exchange for business opposition to certain anti-union measures on the ballot).
269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part
IV.B.2 (discussing the potential benefits of EDRs).
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mendous social and moral valence that denotes—for most of
us—a particularly pernicious form of invidious wrong. The
overwhelming majority of individuals in contemporary American society believe that discrimination is wrong and have vested conceptions of the forms that this wrong can and does take.
And yet the work of psychology scholars suggests that it is
precisely the widespread social valence of discrimination that
may be driving the difficult odds that discrimination litigants
face in today’s legal milieu. It is because the public has developed its own strongly held views about discrimination—views
that are independent of any technical legal requirements for
proving discrimination—that the drift of the law towards unfavorable outcomes for discrimination litigants is so intractable
and so pronounced. For while the public believes that discrimination is fundamentally wrong, it also believes it is a narrowly
defined phenomenon: a phenomenon that is aberrational and
rare in today’s society.
These findings suggest the need to look beyond traditional
discrimination claims when seeking to protect the interests of
putative victims of discrimination. Using extra-discrimination
remedies (i.e., remedies that do not focus on group-based discrimination claims) provides one such alternate approach.
While such remedies will undoubtedly not serve as a panacea
for the difficulties that discrimination claimants face, they
may—by decoupling the legal inquiry from the emotionally
loaded terrain of discrimination—significantly improve outcomes for individual victims of discrimination.
270
Thus a “cooler” approach —by its nature designed to
avoid the pursuit of moral victories—may be the most effective
means of improving outcomes for individual victims of discrimination. Such a compromise approach will no doubt—like most
compromises—be profoundly unsatisfying to those on both

270. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 492–98 (1999) (noting that framing criminal law discourse in terms
of deterrence is often a cover for other more controversial commitments but
also observing that the cooling effect of relying on a less controversial discourse may make it easier for diverse citizens to agree on policy commitments); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1470, 1476–77 (2004) (noting that the anti-classification understanding of Brown was adopted in part because it provided a “cooler” and less controversial way of justifying the decision and discussing at length both the
practical benefits and limitations that the cooler approach entailed).
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sides of the discrimination debate. But for individual victims of
discrimination, it is hard to dispute that outcomes matter. And
ultimately, what happens to those individual victims—those
the anti-discrimination regime is designed to serve—must matter to all of us in looking to the future of anti-discrimination reform.

